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ABSTRACT

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN IMPULSIVENESS:
A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
MAY 1992

LISA MARIE BECK, A.B., BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Icek Ajzen

Impulsive behavior is a common theme in psychology,
but human decision making, animal choice, foraging, and

personality research define and measure impulsiveness
differently.

The first goal of this study was to

determine how much agreement exists between
impulsiveness measures based on these different

perspectives
A review of these literatures suggests that
individual differences in sensitivity to rate of reward
and punishment may be an important factor in impulsive

decision-making.

The second goal of the present study

was to investigate this possibility.
College undergraduates

four-part questionnaire.

(n = 159)

responded to a

The first part was a series of

duplex bets that assessed each subject's relative

attention to four risk dimensions: amount to win, amount
to lose, rate or probability of winning, and rate or

probability of losing.

The second part of the
vi

questionnaire represented the common definitions of
impulsiveness in decision theory with

20

items posing

hypothetical choices between immediate and delayed
rewards.

The third part was the 42-item Eysenck

Impulsivity Scale used in personality research.
Finally, subjects responded to a single 7-point self-

rating of impulsiveness, and gave examples of impulsive
and unimpulsive behavior.
The decision theory items and personality measure
of impulsiveness were very weakly related.

The findings

suggest that reliability and validity issues with regard
to hypothetical choices of this type should be

investigated carefully before using them in further
research.

Regarding the suggestion that individual

differences in sensitivity to rate account for impulsive
behavior, the results of the study indicate that

impulsive individuals may instead be particularly

sensitive to punishment or cost.

When unavoidable cost

is explicitly associated with reward, as in the choices

in the duplex bets and hypothetical choices in the

questionnaire, impulsives weight that information
heavily, but in many everyday decision situations, like

those described in elicited examples, they may actively
avoid cost considerations, which leads to rapid action,
sometimes with objectively negative outcomes.

vii
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Ever since Esau traded his birthright to Jacob
for
a mess of pottage, we have been aware of
individual

differences in human impulsive behavior. More formal
study of these differences has been much slower to arise
however, and the fields of psychology and economics are
just beginning to explore the patterns and

inconsistencies of impulsive behavior. The

possibilities for exploration of the concept of
impulsiveness are almost as numerous as the meanings

attached to the term. Impulsiveness has been
investigated in several different areas of psychology,
and from different perspectives.
Two major perspectives will be considered here.

One is that of decision theorists, who are concerned

with universal tendencies to make impulsive choices in
particular situations. The tradition of the "economic
man" has focused on human responses to situational

variables, mainly in terms of money or goods that can be

traded for money. Decision theory has, for the most
part, adhered to that tradition, and concerned itself

with the concrete situational variables that influence
choice
On the other hand, personality theory is primarily

interested in stable individual differences in

dispositions or tendencies to behave in certain ways.
1

Many of these tendencies are difficult to measure
and/or
test experimentally, but there is little question
that
humans are susceptible to psychological variables such
as emotions, expectations, and desires, and that
these

differ widely for different individuals.
It is important to recognize the strengths and

weaknesses of each approach while exploring what each
has to say about a particular concept, in this case,

impulsiveness.

This discussion will concentrate on the

contributions of each perspective to an understanding of
individual differences in impulsive choice behavior.
Impulsiveness in Decision Theory
For most decision theorists, impulsiveness is

defined as the preference of

a smaller,

more immediate

reward over a larger, more delayed reward (e.g. Logue,
1988; Ainslie,

1974; Rachlin

&

Green,

1972).

Impulsive

behavior in this sense contradicts many of the

assumptions of traditional economic theory, and has

engendered a large body of research in the field of
decision theory.

Very little of that literature has

even suggested the notion of individual differences in

decision-making styles, however, much less explored such
differences or incorporated them into theory.
Some paradigms for the study of human decision-

making and impulsiveness will be examined first, then
animal choice research will be reviewed.

2

,

Human Decision Making
Cognitive Factors.

One body of literature relevant

to a discussion of individual differences in impulsive

behavior is concerned with the individual's perceptions
or beliefs about the choice situation.

Although

situational factors, such as the context or wording of a
problem, are considered in this literature to govern

cognitive and behavioral responses, only

a

small stretch

of the imagination is needed to envision a more

egalitarian interaction between individual and
situational factors.
Most decision making paradigms consist of

presenting hypothetical situations to subjects and
giving them a choice of responses.

For example,

subjects may be asked to choose between receiving $100

now and receiving $2 00 in two years.
choose the immediate reward.

Most subjects

Interestingly, if subjects

are given the choice between $100 in six years and $2 00
in eight years, most subjects prefer the larger, more

delayed reward, despite the fact that the distance
between the two rewards is still two years.
reversal (Ainslie, 1975; Ainslie

&

Preference

Herrnstein, 1981)

,

as

this phenomenon is called, is the tendency for a reward
to become more attractive as it becomes more available.

When both rewards are delayed, the relative discounting
of the more delayed reward is small.

But as the small

reward becomes closer in time (more available)
3

subjects' preferences usually shift toward the small
reward.

In other words, the subjects' perspective

contributes to decision making.
The class of subjectively expected utility (SEU;

discussed in Abelson

Levi,

&

1985) models represents a

more explicit acknowledgment of the importance of

psychological variables in decision making.

SEU

paradigms commonly require subjects to supply their own

probability estimates for uncertain outcomes, such as
whether it will rain on

a

particular day, or, given

objective probabilities (such as 80% chance of rain)
rate the value of the potential outcomes.

,

to

Although such

models have been heavily criticized for their failure to
account for actual behavior, SEU is notable in that it
sets the stage for the recognition of individual

differences in assessment of choice situations.

Proposed successors to SEU include portfolio theory
(Abelson

&

Levi, 1985)

,

which bases its predictions on

individual differences in risk preference, and prospect

theory (Kahneman

&

Tversky, 1979), in which decisions

under risk are affected by the individual's "framing" of
the problem.

Framing effects are based on an individual's

reference point with regard to a choice.

For instance,

when asked to choose between a treatment that will save
200 of 600 epidemic victims, and a treatment which will

allow 400 to die, most subjects choose the first
4

.

alternative, despite the fact that the outcomes of both

treatments are the same.

Framing effects have been

demonstrated in more naturalistic experiments, using $7
gift certificates for a record store as reinforcers for

college students (Loewenstein, 1988)

.

The certificates

were to be delivered to the students in one, four, or
eight weeks.

Subjects were then given choices about

trading their certificates for larger, but more delayed
certificates, and smaller, more immediate certificates.
On average, the increased value required by the subjects
for a more delayed certificate was three to four times

the cost they were willing to incur for getting the

certificate sooner.

In other words, they were resistant

to delay, but were also relatively uninterested in

speeding up the reward once they had formed an

expectation to receive the certificate at a particular
time.

Subjects had framed the problem in terms of the

point at which they expected to consume, and any

deviation from this was relatively undesirable.
effects can result from the wording of

a

Framing

problem on a

questionnaire, for example, or from recent experience

with similar problems (the $5 lost in the first game of

blackjack is more highly valued than $5 lost in the
attempt to recover from an accumulated $100 loss)

Framing research provides information about the relative

contributions of reinforcer delay and magnitude in human
impulsive behavior, as well as demonstrating the special
5

.

contributions of psychological variables such as
expectations
One criticism of prospect theory, relevant to the

current investigation and applicable to many decision

research paradigms, is its reliance on "one-shot bets"
single decision items.

-

Laboratory subjects typically

avoid risky alternatives in one-shot bets.

However,

they tended to prefer risky alternatives when the same
bet was to be repeated ten times (Keren
1987)

.

Rachlin (1990) presents

a

&

Wagenaar,

theory which suggests

that strings of gambles affect the subjective valuation
of individual gambles.

In other words, although the

value of an individual gamble is objectively negative, a

gambler may perceive it as part of a subjectively

positive series.

The idea that many decisions may be

part of a series of other choices will be discussed in

more detail below.
Although the above theories have little or nothing
to say about impulsiveness, and are in many ways

inadequate in dealing with basic choice phenomena, the

movement toward recognizing the contributions of
individual differences and psychological variables is
notable, and relevant to the present discussion.

Emotional Variables

.

Another recent example of

recognition of the importance of subjective evaluation
in the choice situation is based on temporal

externalities such as regret, rejoicing, disappointment
6

.

(Loomes

&

Sugden, 1982)

,

and savoring and dread

(Loewenstein, 1987) which are by-products of decision-

making that have value in their own right.

The

experience or expectation of such emotional responses
can explain why people put off pleasurable events or

rush to get unpleasant events over with.

Elster (1985)

suggests that impulsive decisions could be the result of
the lack of influence of temporal externalities such as

disappointment and savoring.

For example, the emotions

involved in waiting for a delayed reward may be highly

unpleasant for some people, so that settling for a
smaller reward makes up in emotional terms what is lost
in reward quality.

The explicit recognition of the

importance of psychological variables, both cognitive
and emotional, in decision research represents an

important broadening of decision theory.

Operant Research in Humans

.

Another research

direction is rooted in the operant learning tradition.
In this paradigm, human subjects are studied in

experimental situations similar to those used for
animals.

This methodology allows for meaningful

comparisons between animal and human results, and for
careful control of experimental variables.

Some of the

most rigorous attention to comparability has been
demonstrated by Logue, King, Chavarro, and Volpe (1990)
in recent studies of impulsiveness/self -control

Previous studies often used points exchangeable for

money as reinforcers, but this practice can be
criticized as involving

a

very different kind of

reinforcement from that in animal studies, where a

deprived animal works for immediately usable food.

In

Logue et al.'s experiment, food- and water-deprived

college students operated
reinforcer.

mechanism to receive a juice

a

Subjects were given as little instruction

as possible, in order to minimize experimenter effects

and increase the comparability to animal studies.

The

mechanism was designed so that alternative responses
would lead to brief, immediate access or longer, delayed
access to the reinforcer.

Substantial individual

differences were displayed in subjects' patterns of
responding, i.e., some subjects preferred the self-

control response exclusively, others preferred the

impulsive response, and others showed intermediate
preferences.

In a follow-up study, paper-and-pencil

measures of self-control, locus of control, dieting,
desire for the reinforcer, etc.

,

did not correlate with

impulsive or self-control responses (Bonvino
1990)

.

&

Logue,

These experiments are landmarks in two ways.

First, most human research based on operant paradigms

shows consistent self-control responding and little or
no impulsiveness (Logue et al., 1990; for an exception

see Solnick, Kannenberg, Eckerman

&

Waller, 1980)

.

The

careful methodology of the experiments of Logue et al.
seems to have removed many of the situational demands
8

for a particular style of responding that led to self-

control tendencies in previous studies.

Second, these

experiments are unusual in explicitly demonstrating and

discussing individual differences in relation to
impulsive behavior.

Although the initial attempts at

finding correlates of individual differences in

impulsiveness did not succeed, Logue, et al.'s

experiments are an important new direction in a field

previously concerned only with situational variables.
Animal Choice Research
Operant Research in Animals

.

Animal choice

research is useful because it permits extensive

exploration of the influence of different
characteristics of reinforcement on behavior.

Models

are proposed, and are supported or refuted by results

from carefully controlled studies of behavior.

Human

choice research is in danger of confounding by highly

idiosyncratic cognitive factors and varied past

experiences whose existence and importance are generally

unknown and uncontrolled by the experimenter.

In

contrast, animal studies offer an opportunity to control

past experience, and little concern that subjects'
interpretations of the experimental situation might
affect their behavior.

Most animal studies are of

course performed with rats and pigeons, although field
and laboratory work on foraging patterns takes advantage
of a wider range of species.

Impulsiveness in

particular is

a

common topic for study.

trained to choose between
a large

delayed reward.

a small,

Subjects are

immediate reward and

Interestingly, most studies of

this kind show clear evidence of preference for

immediate rewards (Logue, et al., 1990).

There are at least two important exceptions to thi
generality.

Pigeons will take advantage of a

precommitting strategy in order to receive
reward (Ainslie, 1974; Rachlin

&

Green,

a

larger
In othe

1972).

words, they will make a response ahead of time that wil

keep them from having the opportunity to choose the
smaller reward.

Notice the parallel between this kind

of choice and the tendency of humans to choose the

larger reward when the choice is made before the smalle
Also notice that pigeons are

reward becomes available.

not permitted to terminate the waiting period (to

"change their minds") while waiting for the delayed
reward.

If so permitted,

they exhibit preference shift

as the small reward becomes available and thus show

impulsive behavior (Logue

&

Pena-Correal

,

1984)

We ma

.

conclude from such results that pigeons perceive

a

difference between the two alternatives, and prefer
larger rewards in general, but are, like humans, highly

sensitive to the availability of the reward.
A second exception is found in a research paradigm

for training pigeons to choose the delayed reinforcer.

This fading procedure is initiated by training the
10

.

animals to associate different keys with large or small
rewards.

If given a choice,

the pigeons will make the

response associated with the larger reward.

The time

between the response and delivery of the larger reward
is gradually delayed, until eventually the pigeon is

exhibiting "self-control".

But the argument can be made

that the fading procedure is designed so that, with

gradually increasing delay over thousands of trials, the
animal does not notice the change and perceives only the

original choice between large and small reward.
Therefore, evidence of self-control behaviors in typical

laboratory animals is weak at best.

Although

impulsiveness in animals is well-documented, researchers
have yet to develop

a

general model for describing and

predicting choice behavior in animals.
Matchincf Law

.

One of the best-known and most

useful models of choice is Herrnstein's (1970) matching
law.

According to the matching law, an organism divides

its behavior

(B)

in proportion to the values of the two

alternatives, where value is determined by ratios

between amounts

(A)

and delays

Bi

Ai

82

A2

(D)

^

D2

Dl

.

(1)

This model easily predicts impulsive behavior, as well
as pigeons' use of a precommitting device, and the

preference shift exhibited when the choice is made
further away in time from the point of small reward
11

:

delivery.

However, sometimes behavior deviates from the

strict matching law above in the form of bias
(preference for one behavior when the two outcomes are
identical) or undermatching (behavior ratio is closer to
1

than the parameters predict)

.

Such deviations are

better accounted for by a generalized version of the

matching law (Logue, 1988)
Bl

SA

Al
= k

D2

SD

X

B2

A2

Dl

(2)

k represents response bias and is constant for a given

animal and a given apparatus.

SA and SD are exponents

which represent the sensitivity to differences in amount
and delay, respectively.

If an animal shows preference

for the small immediate reward in a situation where the

strict matching law predicts preference of the larger,

delayed reward, the generalized matching law could
describe this result by saying that SA
Logue, Rodriguez, Pena-Correal

,

>

SD.

and Mauro (1984)

demonstrate that these exponents can be affected by
experience, and thus differ across subjects.

Pigeons

who had experienced a fading procedure showed more selfcontrol responding on new problems than control pigeons.
The faded pigeons were more sensitive to differences in
amount, and less sensitive to differences in delay than

were control pigeons.

Individual differences in

sensitivity to the two characteristics of the reinforcer

12

.

accounted for in this model are thus recognized as an
important factor in impulsive behavior.

Foraging Theory

The foraging literature offers

.

additional evidence regarding impulsive choice behavior
in animals in the wild.

An interesting example of

different foraging strategies across species is found in
two desert rodents, the kangaroo rat and the pocket

mouse (reviewed in Olton, Handelman,

&

Walker, 1981)

The kangaroo rat forages mainly on large clumps of seeds
at long distances from its burrow, while the pocket

mouse chooses the "impulsive" pattern of foraging on
individual seeds found near its burrow.

These animals

have never been studied in operant paradigms, yet the

similarity of their choices between small, immediate vs.
large, delayed rewards to similar choices in the

decision literature is striking.
Although most foragers work to increase amount of
food, some,

including the pocket mouse, appear to do

this through a strategy of rate maximization.

For

instance, titmice in the wild must catch an insect every

three seconds throughout a winter day just to survive
(Krebs,

1978)

.

In an experimental situation, the birds

prefer exclusively
rate.

a

response with the highest reward

When size of prey and rate of encounter are

manipulated, many animals are more influenced by rate of

encounter than predicted by optimal foraging theories.
In addition, studies of different species show that many
13

.

animals prefer immediate rewards (Krebs,
1978)

.

in a

natural setting, reward immediacy often signals
likely

frequency of further encounters with the prey, so when
animals make "impulsive" choices, they may be increasing
not only rate, but amount of total reinforcement as

well
Survival concerns leading to different rate

preferences may be found in humans as well.
impoverished people might prefer

a small,

Severely

immediate

amount of money or food to a delayed, larger reward,
simply because they may not survive to collect the

delayed reward.

People in this situation are

demonstrating sensitivity to the possible frequency of
reward.

Begging brings in a small, but steady, amount

of money and searching for a job may result in a long-

term advantage, but the job rewards may be too distant
to be relevant to today's needs.

Therefore, choosing to

beg may show a sensitivity to rate that is adaptive

under the circumstances.
So far the discussion of impulsiveness in animals

and humans has suggested that impulsiveness may result

from the evolutionary or social circumstances of the

individual or species.

However, individual differences

in human impulsiveness may not always be based on such

obvious distinctions.

Some well-off people are

impulsive with regard to food and money when survival is
not an issue; some poor people exhibit self-control
14

.

despite situational demands to the contrary.

The highly

varied environmental and genetic contributions
to
individual personalities engender differences in

impulsiveness not attributable to the characteristics
of
a particular situation.

Rate as a Vari able in Decision Literature
There are typically five characteristics of reward
and punishment considered in the animal and human

decision literature: delay, rate, probability,
magnitude, and quality.

Most investigation has

concentrated on interactions between delay and magnitude
of reward (e.g. $100 now vs. $200 later;
vs.

5

pretzels later).

2

pretzels now

Although a few researchers have

studied interactions of delay and reward/punishment

quality (e.g. pretzels now vs. cookies later; grass here
vs.

fruit

2

00 yards away)

these interactions are not

easily compared with delay-magnitude interactions.
Thus, magnitude and quality are usually equated in the

literature, if quality is considered at all.

Probability of reinforcement is often included in
experiments with humans (e.g. Stevenson, 1986;
Loewenstein, 1988; Kahneman, Slovic,

&

Tversky, 1982),

and is incorporated into many models of human decision
making.

Rate, delay, and probability are closely

related and easily confounded, so care must be taken

when investigating and interpreting their effects (see
Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon

&

Frankel, 1986)

15

Typically, rate of reinforcement is controlled for
in animal choice experiments, and not addressed in human

choice studies.
a small,

A pigeon may be given a choice between

immediate reward and

once every 60 seconds.

a

large, delayed reward

Choosing the immediate reward

will not speed up the beginning of the next trial, so

although the magnitude of rewards in

a

is affected by the animal's choices,

the number of

training session

rewards and spacing of trials remains constant.

On the

other hand, optimal foraging theories recognize the

importance of rate, as well as the close connection

between delay and rate.

In optimal foraging models,

rate of consumption for a certain prey type is

determined by several time factors

including rate of

,

encounter in the environment, and time spent in handling
and preparing the prey for consumption.

Logue (1988) suggests the following, more general,

time periods:

C,

the period during which choice

responses are made;

D,

the period between the end of the

choice period and the start of access to reinforcement;
A,

access to reinforcement; and

delay period before the next

C.

T,

a

postreinf orcer

Handling time is not

included in Logue 's description (Houston
1988)

,

&

but may be appropriately included in

before consumption, or

A,

McNamara,
D,

the delay

for cases in which handling

and preparation are themselves reinforcing.

For

example, receiving a paycheck and depositing it in the

.

bank is pleasant for many people, despite the
fact that
the money cannot be "consumed" until the check
has been
processed.
Following Logue's definition, rate
+
(1

D + A + T)

C

/

is a broader representation of the time

variables involved in choice than simply delay, and
should be incorporated into models of repeated choice
situations
Probability, mentioned above, can also usefully be

subsumed under rate.

In a probability paradigm with

repeated choices, some of the expected A's will not
occur, effectively extending the T from the last trial.
In their discussion of "probability as rate," Rachlin et
al.

(1986)

reason that probability information forces

human subjects to treat a one-shot decision as if it
were a series of choices, with proportional frequencies
of outcomes.

Probability information is provided

directly to animals on a variable rate schedule (e.g., a
food pellet is delivered once for every three lever
presses, on average)

reinforcement from
chance of winning)

a
.

,

while humans must infer rate of
single piece of information (33%
To take a more common example, when

the weather report indicates a

3

0% chance of rain,

we

know that in the past, it has rained on one out of three
days with the same weather conditions.

Knowing there is

a low probability of rain is no help when we're caught

in a downpour.

It seems likely that most choices made

by humans are not isolated, but exist as part of a
17

series of other choices (cf. Rachlin,
1990).
rate should be considered more carefully as

Therefore
a

determinant of human decision making.
What is missing when probability is described
in
terms of rate (and is also missing in foraging
models)
is the frustration resulting from the absence of
an

expected A.

The potential for punishing consequences

such as frustration and pain (getting rained on, missing
a picnic)

is likely to influence choices made by animals

and humans, and, along with individual differences in

rate preferences, should be included in models of choice
behavior.

Impulsiveness in Personality Research

Whereas individual differences in impulsiveness
have been largely neglected in animal choice and human

decision research, individual differences in the ability
to tolerate delay have been the focus of much

personality research.

The relevant work of Mischel,

Eysenck, and Gray is considered here.

Delav of Gratification
Mischel 's delay of gratification paradigm is based
on a definition that matches the decision literature's

definition of impulsiveness.

Mischel demonstrated

differences in children's ability to delay
gratification, in other words, to resist temptation to

fulfill a desire immediately in order to get a larger
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reward later (Mischel, 1974; Mischel, Shoda,
1988; Mischel, Shoda,

&

&

Peake,

Rodriguez, 1989).

Cognitive and attentional processes used by
subjects to sustain delay of gratification are
explored
in Mischel 's work.

in particular, children who are able

to wait for the larger reward tend to use strategies
for

occupying themselves with thoughts other than those
about the consummatory properties of the reward.

Subjects who thought about the "hot" aspects of the

reward were much less likely to wait.

Such emotional

and cognitive factors seem relevant to a discussion of
impulsiveness, but, except for recent work by

Loewenstein cited above, have been neglected in decision
theory and research.
Central in Mischel 's work is an explicit interest
in individual differences in delay of gratification, and

dispositional correlates of self-control have also been
investigated.

For instance, four-year-olds who prefer

delayed rewards tend to be more intelligent, more
socially responsible, more resistant to temptation, and
more ambitious.

Ten years later, these children are

described by their parents as being more competent
academically and socially than their peers, more able to
cope with frustration and resist temptation, more selfassured, verbally fluent and expressive, and planful
(Mischel, Shoda

&

Rodriguez, 1989).

Peake,

1988; Mischel,

Shoda,

&

Preschool delay times were also
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significantly related to SAT scores.

These results

suggest that the experimental situation
left ample room
for relevant individual differences
to act on behavior,
and that these differences are related
to many aspects
of behavior, as well as being temporally
stable.

As mentioned above, Mischel's paradigm
relies on
the familiar choice between a small,
immediate

reinforcer and a large, delayed reinforcer.

it has

something else in common with decision theory,
however:
a lack of attention to rate preferences.

Mischel's

research has been criticized on the grounds that
subjects who make the "impulsive" choice not to delay
are in fact responding to the chance to get out of the

experiment early and obtain extraexperimental rewards.
This argument leads to the possibility that "the child
is sensitive to the rate of access to extraexperimental

rewards" (emphasis added; Sonuga-Barke, 1988, p. 694).

Mischel attempted to make clear to his subjects that
their choice would not affect how much time they spent
in a playroom after the experimental situation, but it
is likely that some children (assuming they all fully

understood the instructions) may have wanted to get out
of the experimental room and into the playroom, then
home, as quickly as possible.

Despite Mischel 's findings of stable individual

differences and correlates relating to behavior in a

delay of gratification paradigm, the generalizability of
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single instances of behavior must
not be assumed.
Single behaviors tend to be unstable,
so one-time
choices made by subjects in decision
paradigms may be
inappropriate measures of stable individual
differences.
This is especially likely if the choice
is not

particularly engaging or realistic, as is
often the case
(Epstein, 1983).

Although Mischel's paradigm appears to

have been successful in tapping behavior that
correlated
with relevant variables over a long period of
time,

it

is still possible that the correlated measures
were all

determined by a stable third factor, such as family
environment (Mischel, 1974).

Such concerns leave room

for doubt as to the usefulness of Mischel 's paradigm as
a definitive test of impulsiveness.

The better method

of investigation would involve aggregating behaviors in

many situations over time to detect behavioral
dispositions (Epstein, 1979; 1980).

The aggregate

measure would then be useful for testing theories about
the origins and implications of choice behavior.

Impulsiveness as a Combination of Traits
Mischel 's work represents

a

well-known paradigm for

exploring the links between individual difference
variables and impulsive behavior.

Others have developed

theories which propose a general structure of

personality relevant to impulsiveness.

In this

research, impulsiveness is not clearly defined, but

usually refers to

a

broad trait or combination of

21

,

traits, often including extraversion,
with implicit or
explicit references to risk-taking,
non-planning,

thoughtlessness, and irresponsibility.

Eysenck and Eysenck (1977) responded to
criticisms
of the use of the term impulsiveness in
personality

research to refer to several apparently different
constructs, such as risk-taking, sociability, or

disorderliness.

Eysenck and Eysenck compiled

questionnaire items from several scales designed to

measure impulsiveness, and performed a factor analysis
on responses from over two thousand subjects.

The

"impulsiveness" items were factored into four
components.

"Narrow impulsiveness" is a definitional

scale characterized by items (such as "Do you often do

things on the spur of the moment?") aimed at tendencies
to act on impulse.

The "risk-taking" factor includes

items such as "Would life with no danger in it be too

dull for you?"

The "non-planning" factor includes items

such as "Do you like planning things carefully well

ahead of time?" (reverse scored)

,

and the "liveliness"

factor is characterized by "Can you put your thoughts
into words quickly?" and other questions relevant to

speed in decision-making.
The four factors were correlated with the three

major personality dimensions of psychopathy

extraversion

(E)

,

and neuroticism

(N)

(P)

as measured by the

Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck

&

Eysenck, 1975).

Narrow impulsiveness and nonplanning

were related to
E,

N,

risk-taking was related to both P and

and liveliness was related to both E and N.

Further,

a 13-itein sociability scale was compiled from
relevant

items in the EPQ, then correlated with the four

impulsiveness factors as well as the combined
impulsiveness measure.

All four factors correlate

positively with sociability (.18 to .39).

The authors

concluded that impulsiveness is indeed composed of
several distinct elements, but that these elements

correlate with each other and with sociability such that
they belong to

a set of

traits making up the higher-

order trait of extraversion.
A direct application of the Eysencks' findings

about impulsiveness to decision-making has not been
made, but it is clear that the four factors of the

impulsiveness scale imply certain decision-making
styles: failure to plan ahead, risk-taking, speed in

taking action, and acting on sudden impulse.

It seems

worthwhile to investigate the relation between the
Eysencks' impulsiveness measures and traditional operant

and decision theory paradigms.

preference for

a small,

The standard tests of

immediate reward over a large,

delayed reward can be correlated with performance on the
Eysencks' impulsiveness scale, although, as discussed
above, correlation would be limited by the difficulties
in predicting specific behaviors from global attitudes.
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It should be noted that Eysenck, while

participating in research on impulsiveness and other

primary traits, disapproves of putting a great deal of
emphasis on such work.

For Eysenck, a trait such as

impulsiveness is merely

a

combination of

P,

E,

and N,

dimensions which are consistently found in factor
analytic studies, and for which well-developed theories
exist.

Eysenck (1987) concludes that except for

"certain specific purposes", concentration on specific
traits rather than general dimensions is "essentially

counterproductive" for understanding personality
492)

.

(p.

One of Eysenck' s great contributions to

personality psychology has been the simplification of
personality dimensions to two or three comprehensive
dimensions.

Therefore, it is not surprising that he

should prefer to concentrate on these major dimensions.
However, for present purposes it is useful to extend

Eysenck 's work to provide better understanding of
impulsiveness

Sensitivity to Reward vs. Punishment
Gray's (1981, 1987) revision of Eysenck's

personality theory contains an intriguing model of
impulsive behavior.

The model is based largely on

differences in sensitivity to reward and punishment.
People who are high on the extraversion and neuroticism

dimensions are relatively insensitive to punishment and

highly sensitive to reward.

This leads to risk-taking.

venturesomeness, and nonplanning, in other words,
impulsiveness.

In contrast, high-neuroticism introverts

are more sensitive to punishment than reward and tend to

display anxious behaviors (see Figure

1)

.

The model has

received support from studies showing that extraverts
respond best to a conditioning paradigm when reinforced

with reward, while introverts respond best when
reinforced with punishment (cited in Gray, Owen, Davis
Tsaltas, 1983; also Wolfe

Kasmer, 1988).

&

However, no studies have been conducted to

demonstrate differences in decision-making based on

personality variables and perceived outcomes of the
decision.

Gray's model predicts that extraverts would

EKt'Overted

Introverted

D
Q

Susceptibility to reword

Susceptibility to punishment

Figure 1. Gray's proposed relationships of (a)
to
susceptibility to signals of reward and punishment
introversion-extraversion and
(b) the dimensions of
neuroticism (Gray, 1981).
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tend to ignore potential negative outcomes of a decision

while weighting positive outcomes more heavily, in other
words, would take risks.

This prediction is of course

reversed for introverts.

Decision research has

demonstrated that subjects typically prefer risk when
facing loss (e.g. prefer 90% chance of losing $1000,

otherwise nothing, to 100% chance of losing $900)

,

and

make cautious decisions when expecting gain (e.g. prefer
100% chance of winning $900 to 90% chance of winning
$1000, otherwise nothing; discussed in Abelson
1985)

.

&

Levi,

However, the minority who do take risks in the

gain situation have never been studied to find out why
they chose as they did, nor have any other dispositional

variables been considered.
How can an exploration of rate preferences be
applied to Gray's analysis?

First,

impulsiveness, with

its components of extraversion and neuroticism, and

correlation with sociability, might be viewed as social
risk-taking

-

speaking one's mind without considering

the consequences, interacting nonselectively with many
people, being willing to try new activities and

situations.

Impulsive individuals may be maximizing the

rate of social contacts, thereby experiencing more

successful interactions.

The corresponding increase in

failed interactions is ignored or discounted by these

punishment-insensitive individuals.

On the other hand,

introverted individuals high on neuroticism are
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oversensitive to punishing interactions, and attempt to

minimize punishment by reducing the number of social
interactions.

Successful interactions are ignored or

discounted, and so are of little use in changing the

anxious behavior.

Individuals between the two extremes

take both punishment and reward into account, and behave
so as to maximize reward and minimize punishment.

Therefore, by moving one step further to elucidate rate

preference in conjunction with sensitivity to reward vs.
punishment. Gray's theory becomes a convenient framework
on which to build an understanding of impulsive

behavior.
Impulsiveness; A Potential Integration

The preceding discussion encompasses a broad range
of theory and research.

Some important elements of the

reviewed literature are summarized below.

A model

designed to integrate these elements is proposed, and
finally, a study testing some hypotheses related to the

model and the literature is described.

Preference for Efficient Decision Strategies
Humans and animals have limited processing
capacities, and tend to choose decision strategies that

will maximize the ratio of reward to effort.

In other

words, they prefer to get the most reward for the least
effort, and may be unwilling to use a complicated

strategy that optimizes outcome when
leads to satisfactory results.
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a

simple strategy

This "satisf icing"

tendency (Simon, 1976, discussed in Janis and Mann,
1977) permeates human decision making, and is closely

related to cognitive economy (Glass

heuristic bias (Kahneman, Slovic

&

&

Holyoak, 1986) and

Tversky, 1982)

effects observed in human perceptual and social
judgments.

The implication of this generalization for

choice behavior is that individuals may develop a

consistent pattern of sensitivity to the characteristics
of a choice situation which allows for efficient

processing and satisfactory outcomes in most cases.
Individual Differences in Sensitivity to Characteristics
of the Choice

Gray's (1981, 1987) revision of Eysenck's

personality theory rests largely on individual
differences in sensitivity to reward and punishment.

According to Gray, individuals who are relatively
insensitive to punishment tend to take risks and act

without planning, in other words, behave impulsively.
The opposite of the impulsive individual in Gray's model
is one who is highly sensitive to punishment; he

characterizes such an individual as anxious.
Generalized matching laws (e.g. Logue, 1988) also
incorporate the notion of differences in sensitivity to

different aspects of

a

choice situation.

Although the

generalized matching law has not been used explicitly to
discuss individual differences in behavior in the way
that personality and social psychologists understand
28

them (but see Logue, Rodriguez, Pena-Correal

,

and Mauro

for experimental manipulation of individual

1984,

differences in pigeons' self-control responding), it
provides a useful model for describing choice behavior.

Neglected Variables
Typically, impulsiveness is described in decision

research as a behavioral reaction to two variables,
amount and delay of reward.

But other research suggest

that additional variables may be necessary for a

complete description of impulsive behavior.
Foraging models and research suggest the

Rate.

importance of rate of reward, rather than the more
specific delay term.

Some animals are almost

exclusively sensitive to the frequency of encounter of
prey in the environment, and in controlled tests are
found to ignore aspects such as size of prey in favor o
a high rate of encounter (Krebs,

Handelman
wild)

.

(1989)

&

Walker,

1978; see also Olton,

1981 for related phenomena in the

As for rate sensitivity in humans, Sonuga-Barke

has suggested that subjects behaving

"impulsively" in Mischel's well-known delay of

gratification paradigm (for a review see Mischel, Shoda
&

Rodriguez, 1989) were maximizing the rate of

(extraexperimental) rewards by choosing a smaller but

immediate experimental reward.

In other words, some

subjects preferred to take the smaller reward and leave
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the experimental situation altogether rather than wait
for the larger reward.

As Sonuga-Barke noted, an apparently isolated

choice may be followed by access to a new set of
choices.

Even in an experimental situation, subjects

may obtain extraexperimental rewards through exploring
the room or cage, or by daydreaming.

Therefore, while

choices might be limited in an experimental situation,
humans and animals are more frequently faced with the

potential of maximizing rate of reward, where making an
impulsive choice results in a small reward, as well as

quick access to new choice (and reward) situations.
Rate preferences are, in theory at least, always

applicable in decision making, although the distinction

between R and D may be troublesome in some laboratory
situations.

Probability of reinforcement can also be subsumed

under the rate term if it is viewed as the failure of an

anticipated A to occur.

The use of the rate term serves

to simplify as well as clarify the variables used in

choice equations.

The possibility that human impulsive

behavior is an attempt to maximize rate of reward is

explored in the current study.
Punishment

.

The role of potential punishment in

choice behavior has been neglected in the decision and

foraging literatures.

Although costs involved in

consumption are considered (such as energy expended in
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hunting, or money spent on a vacation)

,

truly aversive

consequences such as being bitten by a prey, or breaking
a leg on the first day of a ski trip,

have been ignored.

The subjective probability of such consequences, and

their anticipated aversiveness could be expected to
influence choices about which prey to hunt, for
instance, or whether to go skiing.

As noted above,

Gray's model calls for an assessment of sensitivity to

punishment as well as reward.

Time, effort and injury

or other loss are all potential punishing outcomes even

for a successful endeavor.

In addition,

frustration

resulting from the nonoccurrence of an expected reward,

mentioned above, turns probabilistic rewards into a
source of punishment.

Punishing factors should be taken

into account in any general model of choice, and, as

Gray suggests, may be especially relevant to a
investigation of impulsiveness.
A Model of Impulsive Choice Behavior
The assumptions and generalizations just described

can be integrated in the following model:
Bi
= wl

B2

Qi+
Q2+

+ w4

+ w3

+ w2

Ri-

Ri+

Qi-

R2-

R2+

Q2-

•

(3)

Bi and B2 refer to the impulsive and nonimpulsive

behavioral alternative.

Qi and Q2 refer to the relative

quality or quantity of the rewarding
(-)

(+)

or punishing

consequences associated with each behavioral

alternative.

Ri and R2 are defined as 1/(C + D + A +
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T)

,

and express the rate of the rewarding

punishing

(-)

alternative.

(

+)

or

outcomes associated with each behavioral
Individual differences in sensitivity to

these four dimensions of outcomes are described
by the
weights for each term.
This model differs from the generalized matching
law in several ways.

The reasons for substituting rate

for delay and adding terms for punishing consequences

are explained above.

Note that the ratios for punishing

consequences are not inverted, as in the generalized

matching law, as the signs associated with the weights
will indicate the direction of each term's effect on
behavior.

The model is represented by a linear equation

for three reasons.

First, the exponential

representation of the sensitivity terms in the

generalized matching law is better supported by
convention than by data (Chapman, 1988)
there is evidence of

a

.

Second, until

nonlinear relationship, the

simpler description of choice data may be the most
appropriate.

Third, the new model is partly based on

Slovic and Lichtenstein's (1968) regression model for

evaluating bets.

A replication and variation of their

study is included in the present study, and the above

model provides a convenient way to describe the results.
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1.

A Paradigm for Determining

I ndividual

Dif f erf^nr.f^s

-in

Sensitivity to ch oice Characteristi
The explicit statement of a model of choice

behavior raises the important question of how the
model
can be tested.
Fortunately, Slovic and Lichtenstein
(1968)

developed

research method which assesses many

a

of the factors of interest in the current discussion,

and which can be modified to test model

(3)

more

explicitly.
Slovic and Lichtenstein' s (1968) investigation

assessed subjects' attractiveness ratings of a series of

duplex gambles.

The task was designed to eliminate the

confounding present in many earlier studies attempting
to determine the relative importance of individual

components of a bet.

Duplex bets allow the

probabilities of winning and losing, as well as their
respective payoffs, to be independent.
In Slovic and Lichtenstein' s study, the bets were

presented on discs, one for wins and one for losses.
The subject must (hypothetically) spin each disc to

determine the outcome of the game.

In each game,

it was

possible for the subject to both win and lose, lose and
not win, win and not lose, or neither win nor lose.

example of the stimuli used is presented in Figure
34;

see appendix A for the complete set of items).
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An
2

(p.

WIN $1

LOSE $1

WIN 0

LOSE 0

Figure 2. Example of stimuli used in Slovic and
Lichtenstein's (1968) duplex gamble task.
Probability of winning and probability of losing
(PW and PL) occurred at three levels:

.2,

.4,

and .8*

Amount to win and lose ($W and

$L)

three levels: $1, $2, and $4.

Combinations of the risk

also occurred at

dimensions resulted in 27 different bets to be rated,

with an average expected value of zero. (Note: Slovic
and Lichtenstein report equivalent results using all

possible combinations of risk dimensions (81 bets) and

with 21

,

which is the next smallest number of bets

allowing for equal representation of all dimension
levels.)

For instance, the bet in figure

2

can be

described as follows:
PW =

.4

PL =

.2

EV = $.20
$W = $1

$L = $1

Subjects rated the attractiveness of each bet on a

scale of -5 to +5.

Subjects were also required to

submit bids for the opportunity to play each game.
Comparison of bidding results with rating results showed
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the same pattern of responding, leading Slovic
and

Lichtenstein to suspect that bidding involves a twostage process.

The subject determines how much he or

she would like to play the game, then translates the

game's attractiveness into monetary units.

For Slovic

and Lichtenstein, then, ratings and bids were equally

useful for determining the subject's evaluation of a
game.

In the current study, only attractiveness ratings

were obtained.
Slovic and Lichtenstein correlated subjects'

attractiveness ratings with the levels of each of the
four risk dimensions across the 27 bets.

Regression

analysis was used to determine each subject's weights
for the four risk dimensions.

Slovic and Lichtenstein

found notable individual differences in weighting
patterns.

The responses of many subjects were

overwhelmingly determined by one or two of the risk
dimensions, while large changes in the less important

factors had little effect.

These differences are

evident in the comments elicited from subjects at the
end of the study.

Following are two examples: "I

decided wholly on the basis of amount to lose"; "I found

playing the bets most desirable only when
excellent chance of winning.
attention to the amount

I

.

.

I

had an

didn't pay much

would win or lose." (Slovic

and Lichtenstein, 1968, p. 10).
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Each subject's weights are correlated with measures
of impulsiveness obtained in the other questionnaires,

described below.

proposed model

Expressed as a special case of the

(3),

the equation tested by the Slovic

and Lichtenstein variation is as follows:

Attractiveness of B = wl(Q+) + w2(Q-) + w3
(4)

(R+)

+ w4(R-)

since the variation involves a rating of a single

behavior rather than a choice between behavioral
alternatives
Their investigation followed from two ideas that
are similar to the generalizations on which model
based.

(3)

is

The first is "importance beliefs", described as

follows: "when a person evaluates a bet, he pays more

attention to some risk dimensions than to others because
he believes that these particular dimensions are most

important for his present decision" (Slovic
Lichtenstein, 1968, p. 1).
(3)

&

Note that the proposed model

of impulsive choice in this paper is based on a

similar assumption, except that instead of evaluating
the dimensions of every choice situation, subjects in

the new conception are believed to possess more stable

individual differences in sensitivity to dimensions of

choice situations.

In other words,

individuals tend to

display a similar pattern of sensitivity to dimensions
of choice in a variety of choice situations.

The second idea noted in Slovic and Lichtenstein
(1968)

is that a person's capacity for employing

36

importance beliefs may be limited.

Stress, time

constraints, or amount of information available may lead

the decision maker to neglect or overuse some items of
information.

Both of the above considerations result in

sensitivity to choice information that differs according
to the individual's beliefs and the current choice

situation.

The present research focuses on stable

individual differences in patterns of sensitivity which
lead to differences in impulsive choice.

Research Plan and Hypotheses
Several hypotheses are tested in the current study.

Most generally, it is expected that individual

differences in sensitivity to different dimensions of
choice situation exist.

a

In keeping with the above

discussion, impulsive individuals are expected to

highly sensitive to rate of reward, and

b)

a)

be

be relatively

insensitive to potential punishment.

Conversely, the

least impulsive individuals should be

a)

uninterested in rate of reward and

highly sensitive

to potential punishment.

b)

relatively

The least impulsive

individuals, that is, those who are at the opposite

extreme from impulsives, may share impulsives' higher

sensitivity to rate, in which case we expect

nonimpulsives to be highly sensitive not only to
punishment, but to the rate of potential punishment in
particular. Comparison of subjects' weights choice

dimensions and correlations between the weights and

other impulsiveness measures tests the hypothesis that
rate information is relevant to human decision making
and that probability is merely a special case of rate.
Furthermore, the agreement between different

measures and definitions of impulsiveness is tested
using the results of three questionnaires as well as the
subject^s self-report of impulsiveness.

The first

questionnaire assesses, using Slovic and Lichtenstein's
procedure, each subject's weighting of the dimensions of

choice situations.

The second is a measure of impulsive

choice using items based on the decision research

definition of impulsiveness (preference of small,
immediate to large, delayed reward)

.

The third is the

EIS, a 42-item impulsivity questionnaire.

Finally,

subjects respond to the question "I am an impulsive
person" on a 7-point true-false scale, and give examples
of impulsive and non-impulsive behavior.

Given the

greatly different definitions on which the impulsiveness
scales are based, close agreement is unlikely.

Comparison of scores on the scales with each other and
with subjects' self-reports and examples of
impulsiveness provides insight into the definition of
impulsiveness and the value of the measures tested.
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CHAPTER II

METHOD

Questionnaire

Duplex Gamble Task: Rate Variation
The present study replicated Slovic and

Lichtenstein's (1968) study in order to assess
individual differences in attention to four risk

dimensions of a bet.

In addition, a variation of Slovic

and Lichtenstein's procedure in which rate of winning
and losing was substituted for probability was
introduced.
In the current study, a variation of the Slovic and

Lichtenstein (1968) procedure was used to examine
subjects' sensitivity to rate of winning and losing

rather than probability of winning and losing.

In the

rate version, subjects were told that each of the 27

games represented an hour of play, and they rated the

attractiveness of each game.

Rate was determined by the

hypothetical spin of a disc which had six divisions to
A pilot study was devised to test whether the
amount of money to be won and lost should be changed to
keep up with 20 years of inflation since SL's study, and
to determine which of three levels of rate intervals
should be used in the rate version of the duplex gamble
Although differences between the versions were
task.
small, there appeared to be more individual differences
in weighting of risk dimensions for the bets in which
the amount of money to be won or lost was $10, $2 0 and
$40, and for the rate intervals of one to five minutes,
two to ten minutes, and four to 2 0 minutes, than for
longer rate intervals.
1
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indicate the number of minutes the subject would wait

before winning or losing the indicated amount, then
spinning again.
As illustrated in Figure

3,

the subject was faced

with one win disc and one loss disc for every game (see
appendix B for the complete set of items)
probability version.

,

as for the

At the beginning of "play", both

discs are spun simultaneously, then each disc is spun
independently depending on the previous outcome.

Three

LOSE $40

WIN $10

Figure 3. Example of stimuli used in rate version of
duplex gamble task.

different ranges of rate were expressed by the discs.
The range of five delays found on each disc introduced
some uncertainty into the expected delay, and forced

subjects to develop their own heuristics for play by

making it difficult to calculate the expected gains and
losses over an hour of play.

In other words, subjects

were less likely to simply determine the expected value
of each game and translate that into an attractiveness

rating.

(No such precautions were taken in the Slovic

40

and Lichtenstein design, and no information is provided
as to whether any of their subjects used or reported

using the expected value strategy.)
The average delays for the three rate discs were

minutes,

minutes, and 12 minutes.

6

3

The ratio of delays

on the rate discs was the same as the ratio of

probabilities used by Slovic and Lichtenstein, that is,
1:2:4.

Decision Research Items
A group of items based on hypothetical choices like

those used in decision making research were used.

All

of the items involved an element of delay; a subscale of

nine items was intended to specifically represent

choices between small, immediate and large, delayed
Some items were written for the present

rewards.

investigation, some have been used in published
research, and others were based on actual choices or

examples discussed, but not tested, in the decision
literature.

Many of these items were not originally

formulated with regard to an investigation of individual

differences in impulsiveness, but were included because
they could be expected to relate to impulsive decision
making.

Most research done with this type of item

merely indicates the percentage of subjects choosing
each alternative, and is not concerned with correlates
of choice.

The following is an example of the items:

"You have just won a contest.
41

You can either receive

)

$100 now, or $200 at a later time.

What is the longest

you would be willing to wait for the $200 prize?" (See

appendix C for the complete set of items, their origins
and scoring.

Evsenck Impulsivitv Scale
The Eysenck Impulsivity Scale is a compilation of
items designed to measure impulsiveness taken from

several personality inventories.

Under factor analysis,

the items break down into four factors: definitional
items comprising "narrow" impulsiveness (e.g. "Do you

often do things on the spur of the moment?")

,

risk-

taking (e.g. "Would life with no danger in it be too
dull for you?")

,

nonplanning (e.g. "Do you like planning

things carefully ahead of time?", and carefreeness (e.g.
"Can you put your thoughts into words quickly?")

.

(See

appendix D for the complete set of items.)
Self-report of Impulsiveness
Finally, subjects provided a self-report of

impulsiveness, as well as behavioral examples of

impulsiveness and unimpulsiveness.

Subjects also

provided personal information (sex, age, class, GPA, SAT
scores, major) to be correlated with the other measures

on the questionnaire.

Shoda

&

Peake,

Mischel's findings (Mischel,

1988; Mischel, Shoda

&

Rodriguez, 1989),

suggest a correlation between academic performance and
impulsiveness, which will be tested.
for complete set of items.)
42

(See appendix E

Subjects

Subjects were 159 University of Massachusetts

undergraduates, who received experimental credit for

their participation.

Forty of the subjects were male,

118 were female, and one subject did not indicate sex.

The subjects were recruited from psychology classes

where they heard a brief description of the study and,
if interested in participating, received a questionnaire

with instructions for completing and returning it.

Approximately 70% of the questionnaires distributed were
returned.

Procedure

Eighty-seven of the subjects rated the

attractiveness of 27 duplex gambles in a replication of
Slovic and Lichtenstein' s (1968) study, and 72 rated 27
bets in which probability of winning or losing was

replaced by rate of winning or losing.

Subjects

received written instruction for completing the rating
tasks properly.

They were asked to indicate starting

and finishing times for the rating task to investigate

whether speed of task completion is a useful correlate
of impulsiveness.

After completing the probability or

rate version of the duplex gambles, all subjects filled
out the other questionnaires in the following order:

decision research items, Eysenck Impulsivity Scale,
self-report of impulsivity, behavioral examples of
impulsiveness and nonimpulsiveness, and personal
43

information.

Self -report and behavioral examples were

completed at the end to avoid sensitizing subjects to
the idea that they were being tested for impulsiveness,
and to prevent their responses to other items from being

colored by their own definitions of impulsiveness.

44

CHAPTER III
RESULTS

Subject Characteristics

There were no significant differences between

probability and rate versions on background variables
such as age, sex, and SAT score.

mean

(SD)

Table

1

displays the

for each background variable for subjects

completing the rate and probability versions, separately
and combined.

On average, subjects were about 20 years

in their third year of college, had a grade point

old,

average of 3.0, and combined SAT score of 1078.

Seventy-five percent were female.

Table

1

Subject Characteristics: Mean (SD) for Probability and
Rate Versions. Separately and Combined.
Probability

Age
Sex (1=M, 2=F)
Year in school
GPA
SAT score

20.48
1.79
2.49
2.95
1065.70

Combined

Rate

(n=159)

(n=72)

(n=87)

(2.91)
(.41)
(1.08)
(.54)
(133.71)

20.74
1.69
2.69
3.06
1092.03

(4

19)

.

(.46)
(.93)
(.45)

(131.07)

20.60
1.75
2.58
3.00
1078.00

(3.55)
(.44)
(1.02)
(.50)
(132.65)

Reliability and Intercorrelations of EIS
and Decision Scales

Alpha reliability coefficients for the four

subscales of the EIS are as follows:

.79 for the

definitional scale; .65 for risktaking; .59 for
nonplanning; and .57 for liveliness.
45

Alpha reliability

.

for the entire scale is .84.

Reliability coefficients

are reported on the diagonal of the correlation matrix
in Table

2

(p.

45)

The four subscales of the EIS were significantly

correlated with each other and with total EIS score.
These correlations ranged from .26 to .81 (median =
Similar patterns of intercorrelations has been

.42).

observed in earlier investigations (Eysenck
1977; Beck, 1989).

&

Eysenck,

Intercorrelations between the

subscales are displayed in Table

2

(p.

45)

.

Standardized item alpha reliability for the 20-item

decision scale was .50.

Nine items representing the

definition of impulsiveness as preference for a small
immediate vs a large delayed reward had an alpha

reliability of .40.

(See Appendix C for the items

making up this scale.)

Reliability coefficients are

reported on the diagonal of the correlation matrix in
Table

2

(p.

47)

.

Reliability of these scales is itself

an issue and will be discussed in the next chapter.

Dimension Weights
For both the probability and rate versions of

Slovic and Lichtenstein' s (1968) task, subjects'

attractiveness ratings were correlated with the levels
of each of the four risk dimensions across the 27

gambles.

Regression analysis (described in Chapter

was used to determine each subject's weights for the
four risk dimensions.

Following Slovic and
46

I)

47

Lichtenstein, individual differences in weighting

patterns are apparent in that on average, a subject's

highest weighting of a dimension is more than twice the
size of his or her lowest weighting.

For the

probability version, the average maximum weighting was
.58,

and the average minimum weighting was .18.

For the

rate version, the average maximum weighting was .53, and
the average minimum weighting was .25.
Subjects' attractiveness ratings were also

correlated with the expected value for each gamble.

For

the probability version, correlations ranged between .31 and .89, with median .64.

For the rate version,

correlations ranged between -.22 and .86, with median
.66.

It is interesting to note that some subjects

marked the questionnaire with what appeared to be
expected value calculations.

However, either because

they did not do the calculations properly, or because

translating a calculated expected value into an
attractiveness rating required subjective judgments,
these subjects' EV x evaluation correlation coefficients

were not notably high, and their weights were not so
similar as to suggest that each dimension was weighted
equally.

Differences between Probability and Rate Versions
Table

3

(p.

49)

shows the mean attractiveness

ratings for each of the 27 duplex bets, for subjects

completing the probability and rate versions of the
48

1

Table

);
)

)

3

Comparison of Mean Attractiveness Ratings fSDs^ of
Probability and Rate Versions of Duplex Bets
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-.33 (2.08)
-.28 (2.88)
1.06 (2.70)
-.54 (2.32)
2.03 (2.23)
1.38 (2.59)
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4.01 (2.11)
•

The expected value for this game is incorrectly listed
by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968, Table 2) as -.60.
*

*

E < .01, 2-tailed.
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.

questionnaire.

Eleven of the 27 comparisons show

significant differences between the means (t-test,
e
.01,

<

2-tailed; the more stringent level of significance

is because of the relatively large number of

comparisons)

.

Fifteen of the differences showed that

the item was rated more attractive in the rate version;
for the other 12 items, the item was more attractive in

the probability version.

The mean attractiveness rating

over all 27 items was -.64 for the probability version
and -.48 for the rate version.

The mean of the standard

deviations of attractiveness ratings across the 27 items
was 2.26 for the probability version and 2.22 for the
rate version.
Table

4

(p.

51)

shows comparisons for other

measures on the questionnaire.

The weighting of risk

dimensions for the duplex bets might be expected to show

differences between questionnaire versions, especially
given the differences on individual bets discussed
above.

For all but one of the risk dimensions, money to

lose, there was a significant difference in average

weighting of probability and rate version items.
Notably, rate to win and rate to lose were both weighted

more heavily (.40 and -.46) than probability to win and
lose

(

.25 and -.35)

To study individual differences in patterns of

weighting the risk dimensions, weights were converted to
z-scores, after reversing the signs of the two loss
50

Table

4

Dimens ion Weights and Impulsiveness Measures: Comparison
of Mean s fSDs) for Probability and Rate Versions of
Questionnaire

Probabi 1 ity

Dimension weights
Prob/Rate to win
Money to win
Prob/Rate to lose
Money to lose
Z-scored dimension weights
Prob/Rate to win
Money to win
Prob/Rate to lose
Money to lose
Impulsiveness measures
Self -report
Decision scale
9-item subscale
EIS - Total
Narrow definition
Nonplanning
Risktaking
Liveliness
EV X Evaluation
Time
*

E

<

.05,

25
•

•

*

•

44
35
35

62
58

.02
.02

<

3.

.

12

31..06
13 .48

20 15
2 .85
5 .66
5 .79
3 .06
.58
10 .76
,

2-tailed.

51

I

•

1

•

1

•

18)
21)
19)

1

•

25)

83)
• 83)
• 93)
(1 .03)

1

•

I

1

.29)
.48)
.07)
.46)
.33)
.52)
.53)
.64)
• 25)
(B .88)

Rate

*
*

•

*

•

*
*
*
*

40

1

•

33

1

•

1

•

I

•

46
28

02
.00
.50

i

4

t

1

.52

2 .92

(1
(3
(2
(7
(3
(2
(2
(1

31 .45
16 .44
19 .98
2 .46
5 .66
5 .52

.26
.59
14 09
3

1

*

.

15)
21)
12)
21)

(1 .02)
(1 .04)
y •
1

•

86)
81)

(1 .26)
(2 .98)
(1 .69)
(6 .90)
(3 .01)
(2 .20)
(2 .43)
(1 .61)

21)
(7 .76)

1

•

.

.

.

dimensions (probability/rate to lose and money to lose)
The reason for considering relative rather than raw

weights becomes apparent in comparing two hypothetical
subjects who both have a weight of .30 for the money to

win dimension.

For one subject,

.30 may be the highest

of the four weights, while for another it may be the

lowest.

Comparing the raw weights is therefore not very

informative.

Z-scores allow more meaningful comparisons

between subjects.

Mean (SD) z-scores for the dimension

^

weights for both versions of the duplex gamble task are
displayed in Table

4

(p.

51)

The z-scored dimension weights offer valuable

information by themselves.

In the probability version,

probability to win had the lowest relative weights, and
money to win had the highest.

In the rate version,

money to lose had the lowest weights, and rate to lose
had the highest.

All of the differences between

versions are significant.
The only other significant difference between the

versions was for time to complete the duplex gamble
task.

Subjects completing the rate version took more

time to complete the 27 duplex gambles (roughly 14 vs.
11 minutes; p < .05,

2-tailed)

Correlations with raw weights were also obtained.
For the probability version, raw weight of probability
to lose was correlated .30 with subjects' self-report of
impulsiveness, and .26 with the EIS definitional scale
For the rate version, there were
(p < .01, 1-tailed)
no significant correlations with raw weights.
2

.

52

.

.

since none of the other variables (EIS, decision
scale, subject background) showed significant

differences, it is appropriate to combine data from

subjects completing different versions of the gambling

task for all analyses not related to the gambling task.
The correlations between impulsiveness measures and

background variables for the combined subjects are

displayed in Table

2

(p.

47)

Correlations

Variables Associated with Duplex Gamble Task
Because of the large number of relations tested,
and the unexpected direction of some relations, only

correlations significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
will be reported.

There were no significant

correlations between dimension weights, EV X evaluation
coefficient, or time to complete task in the probability

version of the duplex gamble task and impulsiveness
measures or background variables (Table
For the rate version (Table

6,

p.

5,

55)

p.
,

54)

sensitivity

to money to lose was associated with more impulsiveness
on the definitional scale of the EIS (.33).

evaluation coefficient

(a

The EV X

measure of the relation

between subjects ratings of the bets and the expected

value of the bets) was higher for younger subjects.
Higher impulsiveness as measured by self -report, and the

risktaking and liveliness scales of the EIS were
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associated with less time to complete the duplex bet
task (-.31, -.31, -.32 respectively). 3,4

Eysenck Impulsivity Scale
The EIS total score and subscales all correlated

significantly with subjects' self-reports of
impulsiveness, ranging from .24 for the liveliness scale
to .58 for the EIS total score (median = .48; see Table
2,

p.

47).

EIS total also correlated .22 with the 20

item decision scale, and the definitional subscale

correlated .30 with the 20 item decision scale and .33
with the 9-item decision scale (p

<

.01).

Decision Research Scale
Scores on the 20-item scale were correlated with

total EIS score (.22) and with the definitional EIS

subscale (.30).

The 9-item decision scale was also

correlated with the definitional EIS subscale (.33; see
Table

2

,

p.

47)

For each duplex bet in the rate version, a
correlation was obtained between each subject's
attractiveness rating of the bet and his or her scores
on impulsiveness measures (self-report, 18-item decision
scale, EIS total and definitional subscales)
comparison of average correlations for bets with high
and low rates yielded no differences.
3

-A

Subjects were grouped according to which of the
four risk dimensions from the duplex bet task received
the highest weight. A 2 X 4 (guestionnaire version X
maximum dimension) analysis of variance was performed on
impulsiveness scores (self-report, decision scales, EIS
There were no significant main
total and subscales)
effects or interactions.
4

.
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.

Subject Background Variables

Regarding subject background variables, females had

more impulsive scores on the 9-item decision scale
(.21).

Older subjects had less impulsive scores on the

definitional and liveliness subscales of the EIS (-.19,
-.59, respectively) and had higher SAT scores (.20).

Subjects with higher GPA showed less impulsiveness on
the EIS risktaking subscale (-.21; see Table
all correlations p

<

.01,

2,

p.

47;

1-tailed)

Behavioral Examples of Impulsiveness
Subjects' responses to the open ended items "Please

describe an occasion on which you behaved impulsively",
and "Please describe an occasion on which you behaved

unimpulsively" (see Appendix

E)

were classified

according to the following categories:
Choices between Expressed Alternatives
This category includes examples in which the

subject indicates a choice between two or more
alternatives.

Twelve percent of impulsive examples were

included in this general category.

Nineteen percent of

unimpulsive examples were included.
Delayed Outcomes

.

A subset of the choice category,

this includes examples in which one or more of the

alternatives involved delayed outcomes.

An example of

impulsive behavior in this category is "I should have

been studying for an exam but my friends were going to

pick apples".

This category is similar to the
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definition of impulsiveness as

a

preference for small

immediate over large delayed rewards, represented in the

decision scale.

Eight percent of the impulsive

examples, and 13% of the unimpulsive examples were

included in this subcategory.
No Reference to Delay

Other examples of choice

.

did not refer to delayed consequences, but to a choice

between simultaneous alternatives.
airport

.

.

.

For example "in an

trying to decide whether to go to Boston

Four percent of impulsive examples and 6% of

or NYC".

unimpulsive examples were in this subcategory.
The distinction between the above categories was

sometimes blurred

.

For example

,

"I skipped class and

went to breakfast instead" was classified as a choice

between present alternatives, even though skipping class

probably involves long-term consequences.

In general,

if the subject did not refer to the future ("I skipped

class even though it might affect my course grade"), the

choice was considered to be between simultaneous
alternatives.

The exception was for examples involving

homework (e.g. doing homework vs. going out with
friends)

.

These choices were assumed to refer to the

future consequences of doing homework, even if a future

exam or course grade was not mentioned.

Presumably,

students do homework not for immediate benefits but to
get good grades, to avoid falling behind, or to avoid
the embarrassment of being unprepared in class.
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Many

.

of the examples listed in the "future consequences"

category involved homework.

Otherwise, references to

the future (e.g. "I wasn't sure if

I

would have enough

money for the rest of the semester") had to be
explicitly mentioned for inclusion in this category.
Decisions not Expressed as Choices
Most of the examples of behavior (88% of impulsive

examples and 81% of unimpulsive examples) were not

expressed as a choice between alternatives, but as an
action either taken or not taken.
Consequences

.

Examples in which the costs or

consequences of an action were expressed were included
in this category.

For example,

"I'll do a shot of hard

liquor without thinking about the after effects"
(impulsive)

,

and "Before

I

took the job

I

planned the

pros and cons of moving, including money lost or gained"
(unimpulsive)

.

This category is comparable to the

risktaking subscale of the EIS, or sensitivity to the
loss dimensions on the duplex bet.

Seventeen percent of

impulsive examples and 19% of unimpulsive examples were
included

Planning

.

Examples of behaviors involving planning

or lack of planning were included in this category.

example,

For

"We were near a theater so we went to a movie"

(impulsive), and "Planned a ski trip months ahead of

time".

References to planning were taken to include

thinking about and working on
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a decision,

"it had never

occurred to me before", etc.

This category is

comparable to the nonplanning subscale of the EIS.

Twenty five percent of impulsive examples and 45% of

unimpulsive examples were included in this category.
Time.

Behaviors involving time or speed were

included in this category.

realized what a bum

I

For example

was living with.

moved out within the next

12 hours"

"Took me one year to decide if
a

I

.1

went home and

(impulsive) and

wanted to vacation for

I

week in Florida" (unimpulsive)

.

Examples were

.

included in this category if time was explicitly

mentioned (e.g. "at the last minute", "five minutes
later")

.

The liveliness subscale of the EIS focuses on

speed of decision making, and time to complete the

duplex bet task was considered in the present

investigation as a potential impulsiveness measure.

Forty-five percent of impulsive examples and 17% of

unimpulsive examples were included in this category.
The percentage of examples in each of the five

categories are displayed in Table

7

(p.

61)

,

in order of

frequency for impulsive and unimpulsive examples.

Time

was the most important element of examples of
impulsiveness (45%)

,

and planning was the most important

element of examples of unimpulsive behavior (45%).

These two characteristics make up 66% of the combined
examples.

Examples acknowledging consequences of

behavior and those expressing a choice
60

.

between alternatives were much less common (34% of

combined examples)
Table

7

Content Analysis of Subjects^ Examples of Impulsive and
Unimpulsive Behavior

Impulsive

Time
Planning
Consequences
Choice
Delayed Outcome
No Delay

Unimpulsive

45%
25%
17%
12%

17%
45%
19%
19%
8%
4%

30%
36%
18%
16%

13%
6%
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Combined

11%
5%

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION
The present study had two main goals.

One was to

explore a new conception of human impulsive behavior
in
which individual differences in sensitivity to rate
factors influence impulsive decisions.

The second was

to find out how much agreement exists between

impulsiveness measures based on different definitions,
and drawn from different fields within psychology.
Four different kinds of questionnaire were used to

address these questions.

The first was a task in which

subjects rated the attractiveness of
bets.

a

series of duplex

The bets were designed to permit identification

of each subject's pattern of sensitivity to amount and

rate or probability of winning and losing.

The second

questionnaire was a group of hypothetical choices and
judgments based on the decision theory literature.

These items were designed to assess individual

differences in subjects' preferences regarding delayed
outcomes of choice.

A subset of the items specifically

pertained to choices between small immediate and larger
delayed rewards, that is, the typical definition of
impulsiveness in human decision making literature.

The

third questionnaire was the Eysenck Impulsivity Scale,

composed of 42 items compiled by Eysenck and Eysenck
(1977)

from other personality scales.

The EIS breaks

down into four subscales: narrow definition of
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impulsiveness, nonplanning, risktaking,
and liveliness.
Subjects also responded to a single 7-point
rating scale
regarding their own impulsiveness. Finally,
subjects
gave behavioral examples of impulsive and
unimpulsive
behavior.

Before reviewing the results of the study, it is
useful to discuss some of the findings from subjects'

examples of impulsive behavior.

in light of the

conceptions tested in the present study, it is notable
that few subjects described impulsive behavior as a

choice of one alternative over another, or as a choice
involving the loss of other opportunities.

For example,

many subjects described an opportunity to take

a trip.

They either went on the trip or did not, usually without

mentioning positive alternatives (e.g. staying home to
save money for a car)

.

When alternatives were

mentioned, they did not always involve delayed

consequences.

Rather, choices might be made between

simultaneous alternatives (e.g. going to the basketball
hall of fame vs. watching TV).

Examples of unimpulsive

behaviors were often decisions against behaving
impulsively (e.g. not accepting
to a party)

,

a

last-minute invitation

in which case the alternatives are doing

something or not.

Most of the examples comprising the

delayed outcomes category involved homework, where
delayed outcomes are implied, yet, as discussed in the
previous chapter, the delayed outcomes (e.g. tests or
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course grades) were rarely mentioned.

It is possible

that homework serves as a secondary reinforcer

—

that

doing homework is itself rewarding as a result of being

associated with the delayed rewards of good grades,
being prepared, etc.

In that case,

subjects would not

have to look to the future to make decisions about doing
homework.

A choice between doing homework and going to

a party may be,

from the subject's point of view, a

choice between two immediate "rewards".

In sum, there

is little evidence from subjects' behavioral examples to

support the definition of impulsiveness as a choice

between immediate and delayed rewards, or even as a
choice between two positive alternatives.
In addition, subjects

'

examples of impulsive

behavior indicate that impulsive decisions are made

without consideration of costs and consequences.

This

is not to say that subjects chose to accept the

consequences and behaved impulsively anyway, but that
such concerns did not enter into the decision process.

Even when consequences were acknowledged, subjects

rarely expressed regret or remorse in describing
impulsive behaviors, rather, they usually seemed pleased
at having seized an opportunity.

The conception of impulsiveness as the preference
for a small immediate reward over a large delayed reward

was extremely rare in the subjects' examples; similarly,
there were no intimations that rate of reward was an
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important aspect of impulsive decision making.

(it

should be noted here that many subjects described

behaviors in some detail

—

including, for example,

times of departure, names of restaurants, other people
involved

—

so failure to mention alternatives cannot be

attributed simply to terseness on the part of the
subjects.)

Both the duplex bet task and decision items

are based on the assumption that impulsive behavior

occurs in the context of a choice involving both gain
and loss.

However, the subjects' examples are quite

clear on this matter, and their descriptions of
impulsiveness as a seizing of opportunity without

explicit consideration of consequences should be taken
seriously.

Discussion of the other results of the

present study will consider the implications of the
subjects' conception of impulsiveness.
Eysenck Impulsivity Scale

The EIS as a whole was highly reliable (alpha =
.84)

and intercorrelations among the four subscales were

high (.26 to .81).

The subscales and total were all

significantly correlated with subjects' self-report of
impulsiveness (.24 to .58), and, for the most part

uncorrelated with background variables (there were three

weak correlations involving age and GPA)

.

Impulsiveness

as measured by total score and the risktaking and

liveliness subscales was associated with less time spent
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completing the rate version of the duplex gamble task
.27,

(-

-.31 and -.32, respectively).

The high reliability of the EIS and its success in

correlating with self-report and time is perhaps not
surprising, given the origins of the scale.

Although it

is possible that subjects were influenced by their

previous responses to the EIS when responding to the
self-report item, it is likely that the EIS itself is

essentially a more reliable self-report measure of
impulsiveness.

The items in the EIS were originally

written on the basis of face validity in measuring
impulsiveness, were selected from various personality

questionnaires on the basis of face validity, and the
best items were retained in the EIS using the results of
factor analysis.

Therefore, it would be somewhat

surprising if the scale were not related to subjects'
own definitions of impulsiveness.
In fact,

subjects' examples of impulsive and

unimpulsive behavior were quite similar to the
definitions implied by the EIS.

Speed of decision-

making ("liveliness", in terms of the EIS) was the most
common element found in examples of impulsiveness, and

planning was the most common element in examples of
unimpulsive behavior.

The correlation between self-

report of impulsiveness and the risktaking subscale
could be seen as consistent with

a

conception of

impulsiveness as the failure to attend to consequences
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of behavior.

Risktaking might be viewed as action

taken, not in spite of possible costs, but without

taking account of them at all.
Rate Preferences

Weights obtained for each subject for the risk

dimensions in the duplex gamble task indicated
substantial individual differences in preferences.

This

was true for the probability version of the task, as

well as for the rate version.
The probability version was a direct replication of

Slovic and Lichtenstein's (1968) original procedure.
This task was not designed to serve as a measure of
impulsiveness, and as expected, there were no

significant correlations between dimension weights for
this task and scores on impulsiveness measures or

background information.
The rate version was designed to assess individual

differences in preference for rate of winning and
losing, as well as amount of money to be won and lost.

As predicted, weights for rate to win and lose were

greater than weights for the probability of winning and
losing (.40 and -.46 vs. 25 and -.35).

This result

supports the hypothesis advanced in Chapter

probability should be considered

a

I,

that

special case of rate,

relevant only for behaviors and outcomes independent of
other opportunities.

Also, within the rate version of

the task, rate of winning and losing were weighted more
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heavily than amount to win and lose (.40 and -.46 vs.
.33 and -.28).

In the probability version, amount to

win was weighted more heavily than probability to win,
and amount and probability to lose were weighted
equally.

Subjects appear to pay special attention to

rate, suggesting that rate information is a familiar and

relevant tool for decision making.
Considerations relevant to a series of choices are

more often appropriate than those applicable only to an
isolated event.

This assertion can be illustrated with

an example from daily sports news: Charles Barkley, a

prized professional basketball player, has to make
of decisions on the court.

a lot

If he shoots every time he

gets the ball, he will make a lot of points.

However,

although his points per game will be high, he will also
miss more baskets than if he shoots less frequently, and
he will be responsible for losing the ball to the other

team more often.

Each opportunity to shoot affects

later opportunities, therefore, his shooting decisions
are linked to rate of reward.

On the other hand, if

Barkley is holding the ball two seconds before the end
of the last quarter, his decision is not part of a

continuing series.

His throw can only affect the final

score of the game; no other plays will be affected.
(This is a simplified example,

in which "extragame"

rewards linked to success on the court, such as media
exposure, salary, and deodorant ads are purposely
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ignored.

The difficulty of finding any behavior that is

completely independent of future behaviors itself
supports the significance of rate considerations.)

Most

of Barkley's decisions on the court affect later

choices; his off-court behavior is probably similarly

interrelated.

Sensitivity to the amount to lose dimension in the
rate version was associated with impulsiveness as

measured by the definitional EIS subscale (.33).

In

addition, for the rate version but not the probability
version, time to complete the task was correlated with

self-report of impulsiveness and EIS scales (-.31 with
self-report, -.31 and -.32 for risktaking and
liveliness, respectively)

.

A possible interpretation of

these differences is that the task involving rate

engaged the subjects' attention in

a way

that permitted

the expression of individual differences in
The rate task required subjects to

impulsiveness.

imagine delays before winning or losing money.

comparable to

a

This is

situation in which individuals made a

decision involving delayed consequences of choosing a
reward (e.g. not studying for an exam in order to go to
a party)

.

On the other hand, the probability task

involved immediate, one-time outcomes.

Subjects'

different reactions to these situations may reflect
their responses to actual, everyday, decision
situations.

Although weighting of the rate dimensions
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does not appear to be directly related to other measures
of impulsiveness, the task as a whole may have

represented a kind of choice situation relevant to
impulsive behavior.
It is possible that the task involving rate was

simply more difficult than the probability version,

requiring subjects to spend more time on each item, and
leading to more careful evaluations of each choice.
This idea is borne out by the data indicating that

subjects spent more time on the rate version.

The same

information may also suggest that the probability

dimension was more difficult to comprehend, causing
frustrated subjects to pay less attention to the

probability dimension and focus on money to be won and
lost.

However, a comparison of the sums of the absolute

values of the weights (see Table

4,

p.

51)

indicates

that subjects did not pay more careful attention to one
version.

Disparity of the sums would have resulted from

higher weighting of most or all of the dimensions for
one version, indicating that more attention was paid to

that version in general.

In addition, none of the

subjects (including pilot subjects, who were encouraged
to comment on the task)

either version.

,

expressed any difficulties with

All had been given written instructions

and had completed three practice items before beginning
(and timing) the 27-item task.
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Despite the concerns mentioned above, the

suggestion that rate variables may be relevant to
subjects' decision making, and possibly to impulsive

behavior, should be taken seriously.

Foraging studies

clearly indicate the importance of rate to survival
strategies of wild animals, and there is no reason to
believe that human and animal approaches to decision

making are totally disparate.

Nonetheless, rate is

generally ignored in favor of probability factors in
human decision making experiments (and animal models of
human decision making)

.

The present study demonstrates

that it is possible to measure rate preferences in

humans without confound and that there are sizeable
individual differences in rate preferences.

That these

differences play an important role in decision making is
suggested by the present results, and should be the
focus of further study.

Counter to expectations, it appears that, if
anything, impulsive subjects are most sensitive to loss,

particularly amount to lose

(.3 3

correlation between

money to lose and EIS definitional scale)

.

Following

Gray's (1987) theory, it was predicted that impulsive
subjects would be most sensitive to reward.

In

addition, sensitivity to punishment seems to contradict

the notion that impulsive individuals ignore information

about cost.

However, the kind of decision described by

subjects and the decisions made in the duplex gamble
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task are quite different.

The duplex bets are explicit

in the gains and losses to be expected, and the subject
is aware that he or she is supposed to use all available

information.

However,

in everyday life,

individuals are

in control of framing their own choices, and are not

forced to consider all relevant information.

It is

possible that impulsive individuals find cost
information highly disturbing, and avoid attending to it

when possible.

When cost information is conspicuous,

the same individuals may weight it heavily.

The

impulsive subjects who completed the rate task more

quickly than their unimpulsive counterparts were

responding to

situation in which they would

a

(hypothetically

)

have to spend time contemplating losses

(the delay period before losing money)

.

They responded

in this situation by making faster decisions, and

concentrating on the losses they would be facing.
Decision scale

The decision scales, along with the subscale based
on a precise definition of impulsive behavior
is,

a preference for a small,

larger, delayed reward

—

.

that

immediate reward to a

were surprisingly unreliable
.40 for the 9-item

(.50 for the 20-item scale,

subscale)

—

Both decision scales were correlated with

the definitional scale of the EIS (.30 for the 20-item

scale and .33 for the 9-item subscale, and the 20-item
scale was correlated with EIS total score (.22).
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However, low reliability limits the interpretability of

the decision scales, and suggests that the items, though

based on a simple and plausible definition, are not

measuring a simple construct in subjects' behavior.
It is possible that the "real-life" nature of some

of the decision items contributed to the inconsistency
of responding.

Some items were based on situations

which may have been familiar to the subjects (dieting,
doing homework vs. going out with friends), while others

were more abstract (receive $100 now or $200 at a later
time)

.

Thus, subjects may have had a great deal of

information about how they would act in certain
situations, while for others they had to imagine their
behavior, possibly leading to idealized or unstable

responses.

A more uniform sample of items measuring

preference for immediate vs. delayed rewards may yield
more reliable and informative results.
Delay of Gratification and Impulsiveness
The results indicate that hypothetical choices

between small immediate rewards and larger delayed
rewards (as measured in this study) are not strongly

related to one another or to more traditional
definitions of impulsiveness.

Consequently, it seems

likely that a delay of gratification paradigm, which is

based on the same principle, would also not be

correlated with self-reports of impulsiveness (Mischel
rarely uses the term impulsiveness in connection with
73

delay of gratification, but its similarity to the

decision theory model is undeniable)

.

The next question

to arise, then, is whether behavior in the delay of

gratification paradigm is more meaningful than responses
to the decision scale appear to be.

In light of the

misgivings expressed above about the construct validity
of the hypothetical delay of gratification-type choices

used in human decision research, how is it possible that

Mischel's measure could show predictive validity?
Recall that waiting for the larger reward in a

delay of gratification paradigm at age four is

correlated with good grades, social competence, social
responsibility, ambition, etc., ten years later
(Mischel, Shoda,

Rodriguez, 1989).

&

Peake,

1988; Mischel,

Shoda

&

This striking result is evidence for

the stability and validity of the construct assessed by
the original single-item test.

However, the delay of

gratification paradigm is based on the same choice as
the items on the decision subscale, which had very low

reliability.

The lack of reliability and convergent

validity of hypothetical delay of gratification choices,
considering their face validity and the rather
spectacular performance of the original single-item
delay of gratification choice is surprising, and
indicates a special problem with subjects' knowledge of

their own choice preferences.

In an unpublished report,

Mischel (1962, cited in Mischel, 1974) seems to have
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confirmed this discrepancy: he found that responses to
hypothetical delay of gratification choices, such as

between a cheap, new bike now and a fancy racing bike in
a month, were not correlated with choices in actual

situations, like choosing between cheap toys now and

more attractive ones in the future.

Mischel's findings

indicate that subjects are poor at predicting their own

behavior with regard to delayed rewards, and that the
items on the decision scale could be inadequate

reflections of subjects' actual behavioral tendencies.
Again it is appropriate to consider the problem

with regard to the proposed explanation of impulsiveness
as a tendency to avoid framing a problem in terms of

potential costs, as a result of increased sensitivity to

punishing factors.

In hypothetical situations, the

subject is not in control of framing the problem, and is
forced to take all information into account to at least
some extent.

A subject who is sensitive to cost

information may weight that information heavily when

confronted with it, but, when possible, may frame
decision situations so that cost considerations can be
avoided.

This would explain why Mischel's subjects

respond differently to hypothetical and actual choices,
and why subjects fail to predict choice behavior

accurately and consistently.
Mischel's research offers further evidence to
support this notion.

Subjects who succeed in delaying
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gratification use strategies to avoid thinking about the
reward and the delay.

Children could wait longer for a

larger candy bar if they focused on its shape or avoided

thinking about it at all, than if they thought about its
taste.

The "impulsive" subjects avoided spending time

attending to costs (and experiencing those costs in the
form of frustration.

"Unimpulsive" subjects framed the

situation such that costs (not having a candy bar right
away) were less apparent.

It is possible that when

impulsive subjects are unable to ignore cost
considerations, they are highly influenced by them,

while unimpulsive subjects are able to confront the

punishing dimensions of a decision situation, and use
strategies to diminish perceived costs in order to
obtain their goals.
The correlation between delay of gratification at
age four and social and academic success at age fourteen

raises another interesting issue.

Mischel (1974)

conjectures that early family environment can teach the
skills needed to wait for a deferred reward, and that

these skills pave the way for other kinds of
achievement.

Individuals who wait for larger rewards

classes
tend to come from middle and upper socioeconomic

and more achievement-oriented cultures.

Conversely,

come from
individuals who prefer immediate gratification

achievementlower socioeconomic classes and less

oriented cultures.

However, there are no doubt
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individual differences within socioeconomic groups, and
even within families.

A purely environmental

explanation of individual differences in delay of

gratification appears to be inadequate, so it may be
helpful to look toward dispositional factors.
The ability to wait for a larger reward could be

associated with

a

willingness to defer to the perceived

values of society (patience, perseverance, "good things
come to those who wait", etc.).

There is an implicit

moral element to waiting for a deferred reward in our
society, as there is to getting good grades, being

socially adept, and of course to resisting temptation.

Mischel (1974) himself suggests the moral element to

waiting for a reward when he refers to the type of
individual with a strong tendency to choose larger,

delayed rewards as showing the "Puritan character
structure", and coming most often from "Protestant
ethic" cultures (1974, p. 253).

The ability to delay

gratification at an early age, and later social and
academic success are the manifestations of personal

morality in our society.
Some individuals may learn strategies for

rewards in
minimizing the pain associated with delayed

order to attain the goals valued by society.
extent may
Individuals who value these goals to a lesser
to learn or
concentrate more on immediate goals, failing
information, and
use strategies for dealing with cost
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.

avoiding such information when possible.

It is of

course a long leap from the findings of the present
study to a conclusion that impulsive individuals are

hedonistic and antisocial, but this discussion is an
attempt to synthesize disparate patterns of results in
the study of impulsiveness.

Firm conclusions cannot be

drawn from present results that are often counter to
expectations, but speculations as to their meaning are
an important step toward progress in understanding the

questions about impulsiveness and decision making raised
in this paper.

Conclusions

Three measures based on different conceptions of

impulsiveness were examined.

Results indicate that,

although the same term is used to describe the behavior
assessed by each measure, they are not all clearly
related.

This is not surprising, given the widely

different conceptions on which each measure was based,
but use of the same term (impulsiveness) suggests better

agreement.

It is now appropriate to draw some

conclusions about each of the measures, regarding their

worth as measures of impulsiveness and as research
tools

Evsenck Impulsivitv Scale
The EIS was strongly correlated with self-report of

impulsiveness.

Benefits of the EIS over a simple self-

used
report of impulsiveness are clear: the EIS has been
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extensively, with norms available for large and varied

populations, and the four subscales of the EIS provide

useful definitions of impulsiveness.

However, aside

from being a helpful equivalent to subjects' self -report
of impulsiveness,

it is difficult to see how the EIS can

serve to further the theoretical understanding of

individual differences in impulsiveness.

Eysenck (1987)

,

According to

impulsivity merely results from a

certain combination of central personality traits, and
by itself is not a worthwhile object of investigation.
In addition, Eysenck 's central personality dimensions

provide only a descriptive explanation of impulsiveness,
and lead to few testable hypotheses about the

psychological processes involved in impulsive behavior
or its origins.

A measure like the EIS which is based

on a descriptive theory cannot by itself contribute to a

deeper understanding of the concept of impulsiveness.
Rate Preferences
Rate preferences were not directly related to
impulsiveness, although the rate version of the duplex
bet task appeared to activate subjects' individual

differences in impulsiveness as it corresponds to other
variables (time, EIS score)

.

This finding, as well as

the finding that subjects paid more attention to rate

information than to probability information indicates
that rate information is relevant to human decision
making.

This evidence, while not conclusive, points to
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the necessity for further exploration of the place of

rate preferences in human decision making.

This

neglected variable may prove important in permitting
comparison and synthesis of the animal and human choice
literatures, and promoting progress in human decision
making.

Decision Scale
Items like those on the decision scale have been

widely used (although admittedly not to assess
individual differences)

,

in research on human decision

making, with the assumption that the hypothetical

situations are equivalent to actual choices.

However,

the results of this study indicate that not only are

verbal responses not a convincing substitute for actual
behavior, but that the responses are only weakly related
to one another.

As discussed above, the difficulty may

lie in the situational nature of the items, but this

study produced no evidence that the verbal choices

between small immediate and larger delayed rewards in
the present study tap a useful psychological construct,

and little evidence that choices involving delayed

rewards are closely associated with impulsive behavior.
Despite the concerns just discussed, it may yet be

tempting to say that the small immediate vs. large,

delayed reward choice is still useful.

After all, it

has been the foundation for dozens of published works
animal
and has allowed comparisons between human and
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choice behavior.

But the problems with reliability of

verbal choice items should not be ignored.

The

behavioral choices used in operant studies have indeed

proved informative, but the results of this study call
into question the assumption that verbal responses to

hypothetical situations are related to simple behavioral
choices.

Past investigations with this concept have

used only one or two items, with no attention to their
reliability.

The current study represents the first

time some items (previously used confidently as
illustrations of impulsive behavior) have been tested

with subjects, and probably the first time more than two
of this type of item have been used together.

Continued

attention to this type of choice should be accompanied
by more careful scrutiny of reliability and construct

validity issues.
Impulsiveness as Aversion to Cost Considerations
The examples of impulsive and unimpulsive behavior

contributed by subjects in this study point to a
possible definition of impulsiveness which contradicts
some premises on which the other measures were based,

but is helpful in accounting for data in this and

previous studies.

In contrast to the common definition

of impulsiveness as a choice between alternatives,

characterized by elements of delay and cost, subjects

described behaviors that were characterized by immediate
opportunity, and rarely mentioned alternatives or future
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consequences.

On the basis of these descriptions and

the relations between other variables in the study, it
was conjectured that impulsive subjects are highly

sensitive to information regarding costs, but that in
the presence of reward, they are averse to spending time

attending to costs associated with the reward.

They

solve this problem whenever possible by framing the

problem in order to avoid the unpleasant considerations
of behavioral costs.

Such a strategy may objectively

lead to undesirable consequences, but impulsive

individuals appear to disassociate the consequences from
the reward.

This accounts for the rapid decision making

reported in impulsive behavior, the common belief (even
among scholars of personality) that impulsiveness
"lead[s] to trouble" and is contrary to "good judgment"
(Fowles,

1987, p. 421), the apparent insensitivity to

punishment displayed by subjects in some situations, and
the disparity between responses to hypothetical and

actual choice situations.
This conception of impulsiveness is an attempt to

integrate the results of the present study.

Because it

is based on a number of unpredicted, even surprising

results, it is not conclusive, but requires further

replication and investigation.

In general though, the

results of this study should serve as a caveat regarding

common definitions and measures of impulsiveness.
Different perspectives within psychology clearly
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.

disagree about the meaning of impulsiveness, and common
impulsiveness measures appear to be at best inadequate,
and at worst irrelevant to the explanation and

investigation of individual differences in
impulsiveness
Impulsiveness as a Unitarv Construct

The current investigation has been based on the

assumption that the term impulsiveness is based on a
single underlying construct, and that different

definitions and operationalizations of that construct
could be unified by the appropriate definition.
However, in light of the findings of this study and the

range of perspectives on impulsiveness, the possibility
that impulsiveness is not a single construct, but a term

encompassing many different, even unrelated, constructs,

must be considered.

Such a situation is not uncommon in

academic psychology, although sometimes the discrepancy

between different constructs bearing the same label is
acknowledged.

Memory is a familiar example of a

construct which is defined and measure in many different
ways.

Different measures are not typically well

correlated, but this is clearly recognized and

explicitly discussed, with the result that what is meant
by the term memory is generally made clear each time it
is used.

In the case of impulsiveness,

investigators

using the term pay little or no attention to different
uses of the term, and do not attempt to clarify
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distinctions between usages preferred for different
purposes.

Such failure to explicitly recognize

differences in usage is not problematic as long as the
segregation between different perspectives is complete.
However, scholarship requires familiarity with relevant

information from a broad range of sources, therefore the

existing lack of communication regarding impulsiveness
is inappropriate and counterproductive.

Psychologists

using the term impulsiveness should be prepared to offer
a clear explanation of their use of the term,

to contrast it with other usages.

as well as

If impulsiveness is

not a unitary construct, findings from the many past

research directions regarding impulsiveness cannot be
compiled to further the general investigation, as was

proposed in Chapter

I.

But a more important obstacle to

progress lies in neglecting to appreciate the complex or

multifaceted nature of the impulsiveness construct.
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APPENDIX A

DUPLEX GAMBLE TASK: PROBABILITY VERSION

Please read these instructions carefully.
You are to imagine yourself playing the game described
On the questionnaire you will see a series of these
You are asked to rate each one according to how much you
would like to play it.
belov«
games.

The game is controlled by 2 spinners. One determines your
chances of winning some money, and the other determines your
chances of losing some money. Here are examples of the spinners
that might be used in one game.
WIN $1

LOSE $1

WIN 0

LOSE 0

In this game, you
have a .4 (40%) chance of winning $1, and a .6 (60%) chance of
winning nothing. You have a .2 (20%) chance of losing $1 and .8
It's possible for you to win $1
(80%) chance of losing nothing.
and lose $1, win $1 and lose $0, win $0 and lose $1, or win SO
and lose $0.
On the questionnaire you are about to receive, imagine
yourself playing each of the gaunes shown. The amount of money
you can win or lose on each spin will vary, and your chances of
winning and losing will also vary. In the blank by each game,
write in your rating of how much you would like to play each
game.
sure
Try the three practice items on the next page, and make write
to
you understand the game before continuing. Don't forget
provided.
your start and end times in the spaces

To play the game, spin both spinners.

.

.
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PRACTICE ITEMS

In the space provided next to each game, indicate how much you
would like to play the game, using the scale below:

-5

-4

-3

-2

strongly prefer
not to play

-1

+1

+2

+3

+4

+5

strongly prefer
to play

no
preference

LOSE S20

WIN $20

LOSE 0

WIN 0

before starting the next page
Ask any questions you have
spaces provided.
start and end times in the
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Record your

START TIME

In the space provided next to each game, indicate how much you
would like to play the game, using the scale below:
-5

-4

-3

-2

strongly prefer
not to play
1.

2.

3.

-1

0

+1

+2

no
preference

+3

+4

+5

strongly prefer
to play

WIN $20

LOSE $20

WIN 0

LOSE 0

WIN $10

LOSE $40

WIN 0

LOSE 0

WIN $10

LOSE $40

liOSE 0

WIN 0
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-5

-4

-3

-2

strongly prefer
not to play

4.

-1

0

+2

no
preference

+4

+5

LOSE $10

LOSE 0

0

LOSE $10

WIN $40

WIN

+3

strongly prefer
to play

WIN $20

WIN

6.

+1

LOSE 0

0
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-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

strongly prefer
not to play

8

0

+1

no

preference

^2

+3

+4

+5

strongly prefer
to play

WIN $10

LOSE $20

WIN

LOSE 0

0

LOSE $10

WIN $20

WIN

0

WIN $10

WIN

LOSE 0

0
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-5

-4

-3

-1

-2

strongly prefer
not to play

10.

no
preference

WIN $10

WIN
11

-f2

+3

+4

+5

strongly prefer
to play

LOSE $2 0

0

WIN $20

WIN

12

+1

0

WIN $20

WIN

LOSE 0

0
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-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

strongly prefer
Iiat to play

13

no
preference

15.

••3

+4

+5

strong ly prefer
to play

LOSE $40

LOSE 0

0

LOSE $10

WIN $10

WIN

+2

LOSE 0

0

WIN $40

WIN

+1

LOSE $20

WIN $40

WIN

14

0

LOSE 0

0
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-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

+1

no
preference

strongly prefer
not to play

16

0

+3

+4

+5

strongly prefer
to play

LOSE $2 0

WIN $40

WIN

+2

LOSE 0

0
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-5

-4

-3

-1

-2

strongly prefer
not to play

19

no
preference

WIN $10

WIN
20

+2

+3

+4

+5

strongly prefer
to play

LOSE $10

0

WIN $40

WIN

21

+1

0

WIN $40

WIN

LOSE 0

0
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-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

strongly prefer
not to play

22

23

24

+1
no
preference

+2

+3

+5

+4

strongly prefer
to play

WIN $10

LOSE $20

WIN

LOSE

0

0

WIN $40

LOSE $20

WIN

LOSE 0

0

WIN $10

LOSE $10

WIN

LOSE

0
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0

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

strongly prefer
not to play

25.

no

preference

WIN S20

WIN
26.

+2

+3

+4

LOSE $40

0

0

WIN $40

WIN

+5

strongly prefer
to play

WIN $20

WIN

27.

+1

LOSE 0

0

END TIME
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APPENDIX B

DUPLEX GAMBLE TASK: RATE VERSION

Please read these Instructions carefully.
You are to imagine yourself playing the game described
below.
On the questionnare you will see a series of these games.
You are asked to rate each one according to how much you would
like to play it.
•

Each game is controlled by 2 spinners. One determines how
long you must wait before winning some money, and the other
determines how long you must wait before losing some money.
After waiting the number of minutes shown on the spinner, you
will win or lose the indicated amount, and spin again. Here are
examples of the spinners that night be used in one game*
WIN $1

LOSE $1

When you start to play, spin both spinners. Let's say the
win spinner lands on "3" ^and the lose spinner lands on "S". That
neans that in 3 ainutes you will win $1 and spin the win spinner
You will wait six ainutes before losing $1 and spinning
again.
the lose spinner again.
Notice that after the first spin, you nay not be spinning
the 2 spinners at the same tiae. It is as if the game is a
combination of 2 small games, one in which you win every so
It's possible
often, and one in which you lose every so often.
often than
more
lose
often
than
you
lose,
or
for you to win more
you win.
On the questionnaire you are about to receive, imagine
yourself playing each of the games shown for 1 hour. The amount
of money you can win or lose on each spin will vary, and the
waiting tines marked on the spinners will also vary. In the
blank by each game, write in your rating of how much you would
like to play the game.
Try the three practice items on the next page, and make sure
you understand the game before continuing. Don't forget to write
your start and end times in the spaces provided.
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PRACTICE ITEMS

In the space provided next to each gane, use the scale below to
Indicate hov nuch you would like to play the game for one hour.
-5

-4

-3

strongly prefer
not to play

1.

-2

-1

+1

0

no
preference

WIN $20

-f2

-f3

+4

+5

strongly prefer
to play

LOSE $20
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START TIME

to
In the space provided next to each gane^ use the scale below
Indicate how such you would like to play the game for one hour.
+5
+4
-f3
^2
-2
-5
-3
-4

-10 !

strongly prefer
not to play

no
preference
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strongly prefer
to play

-5

-4

-3

strongly prefer
net to play

-2

-1

0

!

no
preferenca

WIN $20

WIN $20

WIN $40

^2

•3

+4

+5

strongly prefer
to play

LOSE SIO

LOSE $40

LOSE $10

9

WIN $10

LOSE $40

t

-g

-4

-1

-2

0

-I

• troivjly pf«for

not

10,

l>*«Y

!

+2

rf«sr eiic«

WIN $10

*

•troixily |)»«>f«r

no
|)i

+3

•

to |>lny

l-OSF.
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07O

-5

-4

-3

strongly prefer
pot to play

-2

-1

0

+1

no
preference

102

*2

-^3

+4

-f5

strongly prefer
to play

-5

-4

-3

Strongly prefer
not to play

16.

-2

-1

0

-fl

no
preference

+2

-f3

+4

-^5

strongly prefer
to play

LOSE $20

WIN $40
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-5

-4

-3

Strongly prefer
not to play

-2

-1

0

41

no
preference

+2

+3

44

+5

strongly prefer
to play

LOSE $10

WIN $10

104

-5

-4

-3

strongly prefer
not to play

22.

.

-2

-1

0

!

no
preference

WIN $10

-f2

-»-3

-f4

^5

strongly prefer
to play

LOSE $20

-5

-4

-3

strongly prefer
not to play

25.

-2

-1

0

-fl

no
preference

^2

+3

+4

-1-5

strongly prefer
to play

WIN $20

LOSE $40

END TIME

i
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APPENDIX C
DECISION MAKING SCALE

Scoring of each item is given in parentheses.
Where applicable, the source of the item is identified.
Items Involving Im mediate vs. Delayed Rewards

You are going to receive a kiss from the movie star of
your choice. When would you prefer to receive it
(Loewenstein, 1987)?
a)
b)
c)
d)

immediately (4)
3 hours from now (3)
3 days from now (2)
3 weeks from now (1)

At the end of the semester, your psych professor offers
an optional final exam that could raise your grade, but
won't count against you if you don't do well. Taking it
would cut into your summer vacation by a couple of days,
but on the other hand you wouldn't mind improving your
grade.
What would you decide?
a)
b)

take the test because your grade is more
important than a couple days of vacation (1)
forget the test and enjoy your vacation (2)

You are going to buy a used car. Please rank the
following characteristics according to how important
they are in making your decision. Place a 1 next to the
most important characteristic, a 2 next to the second
most important characteristic, and so on (Abelson &
Levi, 1985, p. 259)
Price
Safety
Appearance
Repair and upkeep
Extra features (stereo system, air
conditioning, etc.)
MPG
(For Price, Appearance, and Extra features, rankings of
1, 2, and 3 received a score of 2; rankings of 4, 5 and
For Safety, Repair, and MPG,
6 received a score of 1.
rankings of 1, 2, and 3 received a score of 1; rankings
of 4, 5, and 6 received a score of 2.)
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Given a choice between two classes, which would
prefer:
a)

b)

a class that is boring but which would look

impressive to future employers (1)
a class that is interesting but won't look
good
on your transcript or resume (2)

Which would you rather have (Abelson

&

Levi.

244):
a)
b)

1985

$5 (2)
a lottery ticket with one chance in 1000 of

winning $5000?

(1)

You are embarking on a new career selling used cars, and
are choosing between two dealerships that would like to
hire you. At dealership A, you can expect to sell many
cars each month, but your commission on each car is
rather low. At dealership B, you will sell only a few
cars each month but your commission is high. Your
monthly income would be about the same, no matter which
dealership you work for. Assuming the working hours,
conditions, etc. are comparable, which would you rather
work for?
a)
b)

Dealership A (many sales at low commission)
Dealership B (few sales at high commission)

(2)
(1)

Items Involving Small Immediate
vs. Large Delayed Rewards

Would it be a good idea for you to enroll in a
"Christmas Club" -type account, which pays no interest
but keeps you from withdrawing money until a prearranged
date (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981)?
a)
b)

YES - good idea for me (2)
NO - not a good idea for me

(1)

You have just won a contest. You can either receive
$100 now, or $200 at a later time. What is the longest
you would be willing to wait for the $200 prize?
(indicate days, weeks, months, years) (Ainslie, 1986, p.
138)

(Twelve months or more=l; 6-12 months=2
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;

0-6 months=3)

If you decide to go on a diet,

a)
b)

YES
NO

can you/do you stick to

(1)
(2)

would rather get a small amount of something I wanted
immediately, than have to wait for a larger amount.

I

a)
b)

TRUE (2)
FALSE (1)

Your rich uncle wants to give you the car of your dreams
right now, but your rich aunt is trying to convince you
to wait a year. How much money will she need to offer
for you to put off receiving the car for a year?
$

($0-$4999=l; $5000-$19999=2 $20000 or more=3)
;

In a psychology experiment, you have a choice between
getting $5 just for showing up, and getting $20 for
doing nothing in an empty room for 30 minutes. What
would you do?
a)
b)

take the $5 and leave (2)
sit for 30 minutes and get $20

(1)

You have won a contest, in which the prize is $100 to be
received in 1 year, or a smaller amount of money to be
received immediately. Check the smallest of the prizes
below that you would be willing to receive now instead
of the delayed $100.
$10 (3)
$20 (3)
$30 (3)
$40 (2)
$50 (2)

$60
$70
$80
$90

(2)
(1)
(1)
(1)

In deciding between two restaurants in the same price
range, which would you prefer?

one with excellent food but a long wait between
ordering and receiving the food (1)
b) one with good food and a short wait (2)
a)
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It s Sunday afternoon, and you're sitting
down to work
on a project due Monday morning.
Some of your friends
come by with a tempting plan to do something
fun with
them for the rest of the day. Are you more likely
to
a)
b)

go with your friends, and let your class work
suffer (2)
turn down your friends, and do a good job on the
project (1)

Items not Incl uded in Reported Analyses

At a party where you don't know many people, where would
you be most likely to sit?
a)

in an armchair,

to avoid getting stuck too close

to unpleasant people
b) in the middle of the sofa, so you can sit next
to new people and maybe meet someone
interesting

You are going to receive a painful shock.
you prefer to receive it?
a)
b)
c)
d)

immediately
3 hours from now
3 days from now
3 weeks from now

Would you/do you like to play the lottery?
a)
b)

YES
NO
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When would

APPENDIX D
EYSENCK IMPULSIVITY SCALE

Items are scored as follows: YES=1, N0=0,
except where
(R) indicates reverse scoring.
NO

Do you often buy things on impulse?

NO

Do you often get into a jam because you
do things without thinking?

NO

Would you prefer a job involving change,
travel and variety, even though it might
be insecure?

YES

NO(R)

Do you like planning things carefully
ahead of time?

YES

NO(R)

Do you save regularly?

YES

NO

Do you enjoy taking risks?

YES

NO(R)

Would you rather plan things than
things?

YES

NO

Do you generally do and say things
without stopping to think?

YES

NO

Do you usually make up your mind quickly?

YES

NO

When the odds are against you, do you
still usually think it worth taking a
chance?

YES

NO(R)

Would you make sure you had another job
before giving up your old one?

YES

NO

Can you make decisions quickly?

YES

NO(R)

Do you usually think carefully before

do

doing anything?
YES

NO

Are you an impulsive person?

YES

NO

Would you enjoy parachute jumping?

YES

NO(R)

Would regular health check-ups make you
feel better?

YES

NO(R)

When you go on a trip, do you like to
plan routes and timetables carefully?
Ill

YES

NO(R)

Are you slow and unhurried in the way
you
^ ^
move?

YES

NO

Would life with no danger in it be too
dull for you?

YES

NO(R)

Are you rather cautious in unusual
situations?
Do you often do things on the spur of
the

moment?
^0

Do you often get involved in things you
later wish you could get out of?

YES

NO

Would you enjoy fast driving?

YES

NO

Do you prefer activities that 'just
happen' to those planned in advance?

YES

NO

Do you usually speak before thinking
things out?

YES

NO

Would you do almost anything for a dare?

YES

NO

Can you put your thoughts into words
quickly?

YES

NO

If it were practically possible, would
you like to live each day as it comes

along?

YES

NO

Do you get so 'carried away' by new and
exciting ideas that you never think of
possible snags?

YES

NO(R)

Do you prefer to 'sleep on it' before
making decisions?

YES

NO

Do you often change your interests?

YES

NO

Do you need to use a lot of self-control
to keep out of trouble?

YES

NO(R)

When on vacation, do you look for
relaxation instead of excitement?

YES

NO

Do you think an evening out is more
successful if it is unplanned or arranged
at the last moment?

YES

NO

Are you usually carefree?
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YES

NO(R)

Before making up your mind, do you
carefully consider all the advantages and
disadvantages?

YES

NO

Do you get bored more easily than most
people, doing the same old things?

YES

NO

Would you agree that planning things
takes the fun out of life?

YES

NO

Do you get extremely impatient if you are
kept waiting by someone who is late?

YES

NO

Are you an easy going person, not
generally bothered about having
everything just right?

YES

NO

Do you often long for excitement?

YES

NO

Do you hate standing in a long line for

anything?
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APPENDIX E

SELF-REPORT AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1.

Please circle the number which best
i:^epresenrs how
represents
impulsive you are in general.

very
impulsive

1

2

5

4

3

6

7

very
,
un impulsive
.

?;puls!veLf

^'''''''^

occasion on which you behaved

Please describe an occasion on which you
i^cnavtiu
behaved
unimpulsively:
3.

Background information
Age:
Sex:

Class:
Other:

M

F

Freshman

Sophomore

Junior

CPA:

SAT score (combined math

&

verbal)

Major:
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Senior

.
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